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## EDITORIAL

### **Afghanistan**

Despite the official claims of making progress as given in Obama's strategic review, it is apparent that no meaningful or positive strategic results have been achieved by the United States. Afghanistan remains an unwinnable quagmire draining resources of the United States and its allies. Many analysts now emphasise that staying course, committing larger force, applying more pressure and escalating military operations aren't solution, on the contrary, they have made situation from bad to worse as we have entered the tenth year of this useless and avoidable war.

Two new US classified intelligence reports offer a bleak assessment and say there are limited chances of success unless Pakistan achieves rapid success in Waziristan and thereafter sustains it for at least 4 years till 2014. Military leaders of Pakistan think that the US is finding scapegoats and they are fully aware that Pakistan is not in a position to commit further troops as it would lead to strategic imbalance and political backlash in Pakistan that could further destabilize the country. They further argue that US -NATO -Afghan control is limited to some cities and Taliban still control more than 70% of Afghan landmass and all that cannot be attributed to the sanctuaries in North Waziristan..

More important still are the perceptions of the ordinary people of Pakistan. They are averse to the idea of taking the battle to North Waziristan as in their view launching of military operations by Pakistan Army would have serious ramifications politically, economically and may lead to degradation of Pakistan Army and that may lead to uncontrollable destabilization and anarchy. They further reiterate that Pakistan has lost more innocent citizens and soldiers than all the allies put together and that includes the innocent lives lost in 9/11.

More realistic assessment by experts and strategists however postulate that it is a totally unwinnable situation as the freedom fighters no matter what you label them Taliban's, Al Qaida, Pashtuns. or Islamists or Fundamentalists want nothing short of liberation. Negotiated settlement ending with a total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan is the only solution. "Senior American military commanders in Afghanistan" are pushing for the Obama administration to approve frequent ground raids into

Pakistani tribal areas, where, according to Washington, Al Qaeda leaders have sanctuaries. It is an open secret that the US is conducting what the Times article calls “America's clandestine war in Pakistan,” but that war has largely consisted of missile attacks from CIA-operated pilotless drones carried out in border regions.

These attacks have killed thousands of Pakistanis, overwhelmingly civilians. They have been dramatically stepped up by the Obama administration. It has been observed that since September, there have been over 55 such attacks in North Waziristan and elsewhere, compared to 60 over the preceding eight months. These drone attacks arouse deep and broad anger within the Pakistani population against both the US and the Pakistani regime. The regime has already been traumatized by the release last month, via WikiLeaks, of US diplomatic cables revealing that some US Special Forces troops are already being deployed alongside Pakistani forces in the tribal regions.

News reports that senior U.S. commanders in Afghanistan want to expand Special Operations ground raids into Pakistan's tribal areas in our view have been leaked deliberately in order to increase pressure on Pakistani military leaders to take tougher action against Taliban fighters seeking refuge in their country. However, if American generals genuinely want to increase such raids, then it needs to be stated emphatically that this is a ridiculous idea that demonstrates the naivety of US and NATO military commanders. This would of course be, by far the most dangerous scenario for US - Pakistan relations and could seriously damage the unity of the Pakistan army that could have horrendous consequences for all.

Washington has shown little sensitivity to the national interest of Pakistan and apparently is content with the corrupt regime in Pakistan who put up only token resistance. Now the US is relentlessly racking up pressure on Pakistan to expand its military operations in the tribal regions of North Waziristan. Pakistan has already deployed well over 140,000 Pakistani troops who are actively fighting against its own people of tribal areas. US political and military officials have made clear their displeasure over Islamabad's refusal so far to set a date for an offensive in North Waziristan. The final decision in this regards rest with Gen Kayani the Chief of the Army Staff and all eyes are on him.

It is no secret what India wants. It wants the USA to remain entangled in Afghanistan and be viewed by the Muslim World as an enemy. *If the Obama Administration adopted the Indian recommendation it surely would have huge implications for the United States as well as the wider world.* America has two choices in Afghanistan. One is to accept what Pakistan's military

has been saying for a long time i.e. it is the best interest of America to withdraw early and work for a peace agreement with the neighbours of Afghanistan and the Taliban as well as non-Taliban. The other option is to dig in for a long haul in Afghanistan with defeat and ignominious withdrawal a certainty.

### **China-India- Pakistan**

The summit last week between Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was a disappointment that signals more turbulence ahead in relations between the two Asian giants. True, the meeting resulted in the usual platitudes about friendship and cooperation. But it was obvious that the two neighbours were unable to make progress on resolving any of their current disputes. During the first visit of a major Chinese leader to India in more than four years, some easing of political tensions should have been accomplished. Instead the two sides decided to kick all contentious issues down the road and expand bilateral trade by two-thirds over the next five years. However, increased trade is no panacea for the sharpening geopolitical rivalry.

First of all, while trade may benefit both sides, the perception in India is that China gains more. India's trade deficit with China is ballooning, and it largely exports raw materials to China and imports finished products. The focus on trade, even as political disputes fester, plays into the Chinese agenda to secure new markets in India while continuing with a strategy to regionally contain that country.

Even as these old rifts remain, new problems have arisen, roiling relations further. China has started a three-pronged policy to build pressure on New Delhi over Kashmir, where the disputed borders of India, Pakistan and China converge. It has sought to enlarge its footprint in Pakistani-held Kashmir through new strategic projects; it has attempted to question India's sovereignty over the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir by issuing visas on a separate leaf to Kashmiri residents holding Indian passports.

### ***India –Russia***

India has recently seen a succession of visits by the top leaders of the permanent Security Council members. The British prime minister was in India in late July, and the American president came calling in early November. Visits by the French president and the Chinese premier followed earlier this month. In contrast to the high-profile U.S. visit, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev flew into India almost unnoticed on 21 December.

Although the Soviet Union was India's staunchest ally during the Cold War, India has drifted away from post-Cold War Russia. This stands in stark contrast to India's ties with the U.S., which have steadily rebounded from the fallout over India's 1998 nuclear tests to reach the Indo-U.S. civil-nuclear deal. Despite the relative downgrade in the Indo-Russian relationship, however, Medvedev's visit has ensured that Russia remains India's largest defence supplier, providing nearly 70 percent of India's weaponry.

Russia understands that India-U.S. ties will continue to develop in the years to come and that the India-Russia relationship may not live up to its potential. Despite Medvedev's efforts to restore some of its lustre, but both he and Singh know that the days of a privileged partnership are over.

### **Kashmir**

It appears what holds India together is 'blackmail' by the caste Hindus of Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, low castes and the outcastes. The wave of resistance in Kashmir led by young people armed with nothing more than stones has number similarities with intifada in Palestine. Intifada has political objectives which it is seeking to achieve by non-violent political means. That it has not attracted world attention like the siege of Gaza, it is primarily because the world does not know the situation in Kashmir and that it is also under siege much tighter than the West Bank. Asad Sufi writes: The movement in Kashmir is reviled in India and the West as 'Islamist and terrorist'. They have to be able to show and demonstrate that it is a movement against 'Injustice, Betrayal, and Violation of International law'

LISA has been consistent in its support for the oppressed people of South Asia be they Kashmiris, Sikhs, Dalit, Naxalites, Adivasis, Muslims and those who are classified as low castes by the Brahmins of India. A resolution of the problem that acknowledges the aspirations of its people in conformity with the internationally recognized principles of human dignity and human rights is in the larger interest of all. LISA supports and sustains the idea of India as a multicultural, multiethnic and democracy in its true spirit. But unfortunately under the mask of democracy and secularism, Indian regimes dominated by politicians from the Hindi heartland—Hindutva have been using brutal force ruthlessly against any move to free Assam, Kashmir, Khalistan, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tamil Nadu and Tripura where wars of independence are alive in one or the other form. India and the world have to see this reality for the ultimate good of India itself and peace in South Asia.

*Saeed Ismat*

# Kayani Review

## *Pakistan-Afghanistan-US Relations*

Dr Shahid Qureshi

There seems to be no clear policy of Zardari regime as how to deal with the challenges concerning the US lead military occupation of Afghanistan and drone attacks on Pakistan. Pakistan suffered approximately \$60 billion economic losses, deployed more than 147,800 troops conducting combat operations in the tribal areas along the Afghan border. The Pakistan armed forces has lost more than 3,200 soldiers, with another 6,400 injured. They sustain an average of 10 casualties each day, and approximately 30,000 Pakistani civilians killed by suicide bombers and terrorism.

The so called democratic government left everything in the court of The Armed Forces to deal with, which has already paid very heavy price in terms of financial and human cost. This detachment of the Zardari regime is seen as if they are undermining, damaging and colluding with the enemies of the state of Pakistan. There should have been a review from the government which completely failed to protect the national interests of the state. There is no doubt that problems in Pakistan are due to the US policies and occupation of Afghanistan and not the other way around. US is in habit of blaming others for the failures of its policies as it was in the case of Vietnam i.e. blaming the neighbours, shifting the blame and not taking responsibility. I have discussed following issues on various occasions in the past years as how US policies affected Pakistan as well as the region:-

1. US Plan 'B' in Afghanistan
2. Afghanistan costing \$7 Billion per month to US tax payers
3. US harmed Pakistan's sovereignty and integrity
4. US rule by Pakistani Agents
5. Recruitment of US Agents in Pakistan
6. US Policy of displacement and creating refugees
7. US ignore Indian Army's Genocide in Kashmir
8. Mumbai Bombing: Keep Pakistan under Pressure (why US have not claimed compensation from Israel for the USS Liberty killings)
9. Drone Attacks: Pakistan should go to International Criminal Court
10. US military complexes prolonging War in Afghanistan

11. US to commit suicide in Pakistan's Tribal Areas (FATA)
12. Indian Game in Afghanistan
13. Conspiracy to constitutionally undo country
14. US policy of Disposables Diplomacy

(1) US plan 'B' in Afghanistan. Any plan B in Afghanistan would make the exit hard, even difficult for US and allies. Now they have one Qandahar 'Pashtuns' with plan B they will have three Qandahars of Uzbeks and Tajiks in Afghanistan. There is only one way to solve the problems in Afghanistan and that is way out of Afghanistan without defeated. Shifting the blame on Pakistan would make things worse for US and allies as it would be like 'blaming the pope and living in Rome'. Afghan venture is costing too much to the US tax payers as following report confirms.

(2) Afghanistan costing \$7 Billion per month to US tax payer. "U.S. expenditures on Afghanistan are now nearly \$7 billion per month. This course would not make sense because U.S. interests in Afghanistan are not high enough to justify such an investment. The United States now deploys about 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, yet according to the CIA; there are now only 50 to 100 al Qaeda fighters there. That is between 1,000 and 2,000 soldiers and perhaps a billion dollars per terrorist each year -- far beyond any reasonable expenditure of U.S. resources given the stakes involved. The original U.S. military objective in Afghanistan was to destroy al Qaeda, not to fight the Afghan Taliban, and that goal has largely been accomplished", according to 'Foreign Affairs' report January/February 2011, Plan B in Afghanistan - Why a De Facto Partition Is the Least Bad Option' by Robert D. Blackwill

(3) US harmed Pakistan's economy, sovereignty and integrity. Keeping in view the above spending in Afghanistan by the US, and its support to Pakistan proves that USA has abused Pakistani state, its infrastructures as well caused over thousands military deaths and over 30,000 civilian deaths. So called US friendship to Pakistan proved to be lethal, poisonous as well undermine the foundations of the country.

There is no doubt Pakistan's economy suffered approximately \$60 billion losses by the US led fraudulent 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan because before the war Pakistan's annual trade with Afghanistan was about \$2 billion a year. But who is going to bell the cat and tell US that your trigger happy policy made Pakistan suffer economically as well as human losses to the Pakistani citizens. Over all Pakistan's economy and people suffered losses approximately \$60 billion in the past 10 years. The burden of over 2.5 million Afghan Refugees living in Pakistan for 30 years as result of first US

led adventure against Soviets since 1979. On the basis of logic and probability US friendship with the State of Pakistan has proved to be fatal, harmful, damaging and one sided?

(4) US rule by Pakistani Agents. US must connect with the people of Pakistan and abandon policy of 'rule by assets' because it is not long standing and credible. The Indianised elements in the US administration are misleading the country on the instigations of some lobbies and made US and its friends in Pakistan a symbol of 'shame and treachery'.

The State of Pakistan does not owe anything to the US because United States has taken full advantage of every dollar spent and profited from this love hate relationship. Some corrupt Pakistanis might have become rich but State of Pakistan has suffered with the treacherous policies adopted and accepted by these individuals 'assets'. They see US as 'us' and not United States. So how can it be a dialogue when people negotiating are considered as US assets? Pakistan - U.S. relations should base on mutual respect and equality.

Hussain Haqqani Pakistani ambassador to US should be arrested for issuing visas to 'private mercenaries' with special powers given to him by President Zardari. He issues visas without security clearance from the Pakistani agencies while his wife Farah Ispahani minding President Zardari in Islamabad. Hussain Haqqani reportedly issued 10,521 visas from July to November 2009 to the Americans. He issued approximately 500 Pakistani visas in 24 hours using special powers given by President Zardari.

(5) Recruitment of US Agents in Pakistan. Ironically Pakistani governments and the establishment have always facilitated the US policies? US enjoy this advantage because it has an elaborate plan to ensure its grip on the governing infrastructure of Pakistan. Amongst a number of ostensibly innocent ways to ensure this control, two are quite prominent. One is the 'International Visitor Programme and the other is Fulbright Scholarship. Under visit programme, US attracts important / influential members of Pakistani society i.e. politicians, civil/military bureaucrats, journalist, intellectuals etc by offering a visit to US under privileged arrangements.

During these visits, required people are spotted and later on engaged to work for both short and long term US interests in Pakistan. It does not end here, later on; these people are also assisted and supported to progress in their fields to reach targeted positions of high value from where they can provide required service to their masters. Every year short listing of the potential individuals is done by the existing sources in respected fields that are duly

supervised by US embassy. A complete profile of the short listed individuals is made with special emphasis on strong / weak areas. These areas of the individuals are exploited during their visits / tours to US and they are motivated or forced to work for US interests. Lucrative postings of the armed forces for UN peace missions can be a good networking start for future assets.

According to reports, 'since FATA has become an important area for US, five Pakistanis from FATA were selected to go to US where they stayed for almost a month. Baluchistan carries a similar position for US, so no wonder US regularly sends short listed Baluch nationalists on these visits. US efforts on Pakistani politicians of the mainstream parties never stop. Currently, more than a dozen sitting MNAs (Members of National Assembly) of leading political parties are on a trip to US. It is interesting to note that most of these MNAs are members of Parliament's Standing Committee for Defence, which indicates that US wants to develop source to keep a closer eye on Pakistan's defence infrastructure including the nuclear asset.

In 43 years from 1964 to 2007, total numbers of Pakistanis visited USA was 710 but the numbers shot up in 2007-2008 when 207, Pakistanis have visited US under Fulbright scholarship? These sponsored visits to US cover almost all important fields of Pakistani society which include Armed Forces / civil bureaucracy (both senior and junior levels) religious scholars, politicians, businessmen, media personnel and students”.

The beneficiaries of this US patronage, work for their master on long term bases and reach place of strategic value. All the way through, heavy financial rewards and full protection is guaranteed to these individuals in case they are in trouble. One can simply recall a number of journalists, politicians and bureaucrats, who were caught for their wrongdoings but went scot free to the utter surprise of every one. It was known later that US government exerted pressure for such releases. It would be wise if USA and others connect with the people of Pakistan then recruiting, investing and protecting small 'chiefs or thieves'.

(6) US Policy of displacement and creating refugees. US policies around the world and especially in Pakistan created refugees and internally displaced people in SWAT and FATA to further destabilize the country. Millions of people in Pakistan are waiting to be fully rehabilitated; 2.5 million Afghan refugees are burden on the economy on Pakistan as well as social problems. They can't go back US and NATO have occupied Afghanistan and fighting an unwinnable war. All this is happening as part of US design and not mere co incidents i.e. keep turmoil in the country.

(7) US ignore Indian Army's Genocide in Kashmir. US have forgotten about the sufferings and miseries of the people in Indian occupied Kashmir. US has ignored 92685 killings, 115877 arrests, 15665 home demolitions, by Indian Security Forces, and 22675 widows and 107218 orphans? Kashmir is not a matter of land dispute or real estate. If Indians solve this long standing issue both countries can live like US and Canada. India should not worry too much about over inflated trickle down affect as historically links among the people are much stronger and will further improve. It will leave lot of money to spend on poverty elevation in both countries.

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(8) Drone Attacks: Pakistan should go to International Criminal Court. US has no mandate from the UN to attack inside Pakistani territory therefore these attacks are illegal under international law and a case against US could be filed in the International Criminal Court (ICC). US drone attacks have killed over 2000 people in about 196 drone attacks. Pakistani courts should also prosecute the local collaborators who drop 'Sims' at the drone targets.

In 1996, the United States and Iran reached "an agreement in full and final settlement of all disputes, differences, claims, counterclaims" relating to the incident at the International Court of Justice. As part of the settlement, the United States agreed to pay US\$61.8 million, an average of \$213,103.45 per passenger, in compensation to the families of the Iranian victims. However, the United States has never admitted responsibility, nor apologized to Iran. Iran Air Flight 655, also known as IR655, was a civilian airliner shot down by US missiles on 3rd July 1988, over the Strait of Hormuz, toward the end of the Iran–Iraq War. The aircraft, an Airbus A300B2 operated by Iran Air as IR655, was flying from Bandar Abbas, Iran, to Dubai, UAE, when it was destroyed by the U.S. Navy's guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes, killing all 290 passengers and crew aboard, including 66 children.

(9) Mumbai Bombing: Keep Pakistan under Pressure (why US have not claimed compensation from Israel for the USS Liberty killings). A small minority of greedy bankers and pawn brokers have hijacked USA and

causing harm to its interests. These greedy people want to profit from deaths, misery and destruction by blackmail be it claiming compensation from Libya for plane crash in Lockerbie or now filing a lawsuit against Pakistani security agencies in US for Mumbai Bombings without any proof or evidence. Though many people in the Indian security circles believe it was Indo-US joint operation to put pressure on Pakistan.

US should avoid planned prophecies because one wonders how and why US - Israeli prophecies proved to be so true about everything happening according to the script. One was US Secretary Gates to conclude that al-Qaeda is attempting to spark a war between India and Pakistan. Mr. Gates while praising India for not attacking Pakistan immediately following the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, warned India could not be expected to show such restraint if another attack happened.

Al-Qaeda is a trump card which can be used against any one, anytime and anywhere. Indians were intelligent not to start war with Pakistan after Mumbai Terrorist attacks and might have realised 'the game' behind the attacks? Though there are millions naked and hungry Indians walking about and looking for toilets, yet its government managed to spend \$billions to buy arms after the attacks. Indian media was quite active in exposing the role of a US citizen David William Hedley.

The Mumbai attacks were blamed on the Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT) a small group operated in the Indian occupied Kashmir which denied involvement but then a Srinagar special branch official was arrested for providing mobile SIM cards to the alleged attackers. Mumbai attacks were too big for their shoes though some 'useful idiots' might have been lured into. According to a British defence think tank RUSI (Royal United Security Institute) expert, "around 100 people would require to do this kind of attack".

But fact of the matter is that its master mind David William Hedley is a US citizen from Pakistani father (an employee of Voice of America) and reportedly a Jewish mother. He was operating with the knowledge of the US security agencies. According to a senior security analyst and media reports, "Bizarrely David William Hedley was born in Washington USA to a Pakistani father and a Jewish American mother travelling in and out of India without any problem. Indian investigators, suspect that he remained on the payroll of the US security services — possibly working for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

US backed Zardari Regime is undermining Pakistan:

- Creating electric shortages for no real reason to destroy industry and economy following IMF agenda
- Why Pakistan's nuclear scientist not allowed producing electricity for the country because Zardari regime is starving the nuclear science field by budget cuts, this is denuclearization.
- Not taking stand on water issue with India
- This regime is deliberately taking Pakistan to the failure by strangling the poorest under the IMF agenda.
- So much so that the Iranian ambassador to Pakistan has to make a press statement that, 'Iran can provide cheap electricity to Pakistan and price can be discussed later'. So what is the hurdle?
- According to the Newsweek magazine issue dated February 9, 2009, "And while the Americans blast the bad guys in the tribal areas, the Pakistanis have been confronting problems in their own ranks. Since September 2008, (since Zardari become President), 140 pro-Islamist officers have been mustered out of ISI, according to a senior diplomatic official in Washington, asking not to be named on such a sensitive topic."

Historically US has never been a friend of Pakistan in need, be it war in 1965 or nuclear deal with India, and all its friends paid heavy price be it individuals or countries? One wonders if friends of Pakistan like US and others are part of the problem or part of the solution!

If this is Pakistan's war then why USA is paying for it? Pakistan sold its services too cheap? One US/UK private security guard (mostly ex military) is getting paid approximately £300 - £500 (Rs 36900 - Rs. 61500) a day in Iraq according to press reports. Pakistan's economic and human losses are far more than anyone else. What for?

Surely US know that British couldn't de-Islamise India in 200 years and they cannot do either but it is a good exercise for shrinking brain Pakistani leaders and war profiteering mafia in the US? How can one ignore 650 million Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslims and their potential? One must know that Islam does not require defending?

Following could be friendly advice to the US and NATO in Afghanistan:

- Cut your losses and move out because people don't want to be occupied
- Don't repeat the same mistake again like leaving Afghanistan in a mess after Soviet withdrawal

- Start reconstruction and rehabilitation process in Afghanistan and Iraq
- Hearts and minds could be won with love not bombs, food not threats
- Fundamental change in the US foreign policy
- Unnecessary, unfair and too much support of Israel have made lives of US citizens risky and open to hostility?
- It seems US need to fight and win a war of liberation within from selfish
- ‘Wall Street’ blackmailers, opportunists and hijackers of the very fundamental values of the US society and Constitution?
- Efforts must be made to save innocent lives
- Safe return of more than 2.5 million Afghan refugees from Pakistan, as they are a burden on Pakistan economy.

History tells ‘people of this region don’t forget their revenge’, and Pakistan is not Andalusia. Pakistan’s existence lies in defiance of international plotters? Though Swat and Baluchistan tensions seem to be linked with revenge and grievances but in reality it is a ‘plot to contain China’?

(10) US military complexes prolonging war in Afghanistan. Without going much into US history it is important to understand that US economy and society is founded on the blood and sweat of millions of African slaves and bodies of indigenous Americans. Those who were running these cartels and slave trade at that time were mostly linked with criminals, ‘transported’ from Europe. They were criminals from street cons to murderers.

When we look at the negotiations and dealings of the US officials and politicians with Pakistani politicians, it clearly sounds like ‘big cons’ are dealing with the small street thieves who are not only supposed to earn their living but also give share to the big cons?

I commented on BBC TV on Tuesday 8th January 2008, “many analysts agree that Pakistan don’t need enemy if it has a friend like US keeping in view the policy of betrayal, selfishness and leaving in lurch. “People of Pakistan are asking the way its nuclear program is being targeted in the US and west, one wonders if the friends of Pakistan are part of the problem or solution?”

#### **Following could happen if Pakistan is destabilized or attacked:**

- More than 15 separatist armed militant movements currently going on in India would reach its boiling point and disintegrate India?

- Certain countries could not afford two destabilized states with the 180 million and over 1 billion population in their neighbourhoods?
- The whole lot of elite, friends and compromised beneficiaries of certain countries would be eliminated as happened after Iranian Revolution and this region might become out of bound and hell
- Reaction from 2.5 million retired and 600,000 active members of the Pakistani armed forces and public would be unimaginable for the invaders, their supporters and collaborators
- Pakistan is not Iraq or Lebanon and people should learn from their experiences and come out of denial?
- Those who are providing protection to private mercenaries (black water/Xe) should be named and shamed?

(11) US to commit suicide in Pakistan's Tribal Areas (FATA). On 24th July 2008, at (IISS) International Institute of Strategic Studies in London I asked, Pakistani Foreign Minister HE Shah Mahmud Qureshi, "Foreign Minister your democratic government's sole motto seems to be, 'Visit USA before US visits you' because you just came from the USA and Prime Minister Gilani is going to USA too. On the other hand, 'If US want to (visit) invade Pakistan's tribal areas (FATA) then "SO BE IT".

As you know those NATO Military commanders in Afghanistan have already said, 'approximately 400,000 troops required in Afghanistan for the security and stabilization of the country. Please comment.

I was referring to an interview to Spiegel, a German magazine of the outgoing ISAF Commander McNeill who confessed having inadequate trained forces to effectively counter terrorism in Afghanistan. NATO has only 47,000 soldiers instead of a required strength of 400,000 with a shortfall of 260,000 men. NATO is practically running on reserve, as very few units can be used in combat situation. While neighbouring countries want peace in the region, manning a volatile country with only 47,000 NATO troops and practically no well-trained Afghan Army, the mission to bring peace to the region seems an uphill task, McNeill said"

Analysts believe that the American people are being indoctrinated with the false propaganda through controlled media? Many analysts agree that this war on terror is a biggest fraud of this century? One should look who are the beneficiaries of war on terror? Millions have been killed and displaced in Iraq and Afghanistan in the name of what?

What could be the best friendly advice one can offer to the occupiers in Afghanistan:

- Don't even think about venturing in FATA of Pakistan because you don't have money in the pot back home, and will to bring back more dead soldiers. Indian-Israeli sponsored TTP or BLA won't help at all.
- Cut your losses and move out because people don't want to be occupied
- Don't repeat the same mistake again like leaving Afghanistan in a mess after Soviet withdrawal
- Start reconstruction and rehabilitation process in Afghanistan hearts and minds could be won with love not bombs, food not threats
- Fundamental change in the US foreign policy
- Unnecessary, unfair and too much support of Israel have made lives of US citizens risky and open to hostility? Find way to de-nuclearize Israel for their sake and world peace as what will happen when apartheid entity will disappear?
- It seems US need to fight and win a war of liberation within from selfish blackmailers, opportunists and hijackers of the very fundamentals of the US society and constitution?
- Efforts must be made to save innocent lives
- Safe return of more than 2.5 million Afghan refugees from Pakistan, which could be a breeding ground of angry men against the US occupation.

(12) India game in Afghanistan. People in the know are very well aware with the Indian game in Afghanistan; one cannot be a partner, a friend and an enemy at the same time? Yes it is important that one should have friendly terms with all the neighbours but at what cost? One wonders if friends of Pakistan are part of the problems or part of the solution.

Those who are asking President Obama to send more troops in Afghanistan knows that cost would be over \$1 billion for 1000 troops per year and US is bankrupt country already. The same people who send US to Afghanistan and Iraq i.e. bankers and arms dealers rob it. Afghanistan is a magnet for empires to come and die? Is it strange that Russian experts are predicting US collapse like Soviet Union and Chinese strategists are predicting disintegration of India?

President Obama probably understands that a group of his armed forces and some racist rouge elements have not accepted him, as Commandant in Chief and that is why they want him to send more troops in Afghanistan so more would be killed. This Policy is bound to fail. There seems to be a clear divide between the President Obama's sensible and harm reduction policy and Hilary Clinton, Robert Gates and General McCrystal's policy to fail

President Obama. It was Bill Clinton who reportedly called President Obama ‘coffee boy’.

(13) Conspiracy to constitutionally undo country? On 12th January 2009 MQM tabled a “Provincial Autonomy’ Sine qua non for a Federation, Draft Bill for Constitutional Amendments to Provide Complete Constitutional Autonomy to Constituent Units”. It is quite strange that a party (MQM–A) which bank on the votes of people who migrated and some emigrated later from India and had no roots with any province of Pakistan is allegedly involved in the Indo-US plot of disintegration of Pakistan. So what will happen to those who are not Punjabis, Sindis, Baluchis, Pathans, and Kashmiris living peacefully in Pakistan? Another episode of ‘Biharis - Pakistanis’ living camps in now Bangladesh?

“It was 1974 constitution of former Yugoslavia which caused the break of the state”, said Antonio Moneo Lain a visiting fellow at LSE in his lecture at London School of Economics on 2nd December 2009. I told him that although, “USA is a union of States but no such facility like choice of becoming independent country is available to the states as the issue of state autonomy is kept vague”.

The plan is devious and not easy to understand. International financiers and plotters use constitutional loopholes to disintegrate countries to take control of natural resources. These plotters, their bankers and local agents are adept at creating food and other shortages, unemployment, insecurity, lawlessness, corruption, poverty and constitutional hiatus that make it necessary to invite foreign experts and international financial institutions for advice and help. The whole idea is to pass the control over national institutions, assets (Railways, steel mills, oil, gas resources) to these plotters, bankers.

It seems that minders of Zardari, MQM and ANP have the Soviet Model of disintegration in mind. In modern times international plotters exploit legal and constitutional loopholes or arrange for such constitutional amendments that lead inevitably to the disintegration of the country.

For example in dismantling the USSR the international plotters used constitutional provisions which had been placed intentionally. There were provisions in the Constitution of the USSR – put in during the heady days after the Russian Revolution of 1918, that made dismantling of the Union not just possible but easy. Article 70 of the Soviet Constitution Stated: “Union of the Soviet Republics is a unitary, federal, multinational state, formed on Free Self Determination of Nations”. Article 72 was more

explicit and stated: “Each Union Republic retains the right freely to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”.

Interestingly no such provision or mechanism is available in the US Constitution. According to US experts “the constitutional language is ‘sparse’. It is up to the Congress to give meaning to that language”. We all know who control and gets the majority in the Congress?

Now if we analyze USSR and Yugoslavia’s examples and read between the lines what these plotters are suggesting in the name of constitutional reforms in 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, it becomes crystal clear and evident that sinister game is being played to undo Pakistan from the back door. That is the game of many interested parties in the region including India. Are our politicians making such constitutional changes that court the danger of Pakistan meeting the fate of Yugoslavia? That is the question? What is our so called friend US is doing? Same what they did in 1971 in creating Bangladesh.

(14) US policy of ‘Disposable Diplomacy’ in Pakistan. There is a strong perception in Pakistan that US have continuously followed the policy of Disposables Diplomacy by eliminating its leaders by covert operations with the support of local agents. Fingers are pointed to the US involvements in the ‘Zia ul Haq plane crash and killing of Benazir Bhutto in 2007. They are disposed of like toilet tissue papers?

**Conclusion:** Now it is time that international community should stop shouting at Pakistan to do more and look for an exit strategy? The mess Pakistan is in at the moment is due to the mindless actions of the previous Bush Administration in Afghanistan. On the one hand they want Pakistan to support them but on the other, they are allowing Indians to conspire against Pakistan, interfere in Baluchistan from Afghanistan via Indian consulates.

*Taliban commander in Afghanistan said, “If US (Americans) got the watches, we got the time”. President Obama knows that time and money is running out.*

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## **Casteism Is Racism**

Avinash Pandey Samar

Britain, in a major victory for the movement against caste based discrimination and atrocities, can soon declare caste prejudice unlawful under laws against racial discrimination becoming the first country of the world to do so. The development was imminent in the wake of the fact that the House of Lords had already passed the Equality Bill empowering the government to treat caste as ‘an aspect of race’ in March this year leaving just one more step of getting it passed by the House of Commons to be enacted as law.

The victory has come as a result of the valiant struggle of the Dalit groups along with members of the broader civil society against the exploitative and oppressive system of caste, amidst tremendous opposition of the Indian government and the right wing Hindu groups based in Britain.

The significance of the development lies in the fact that it has taken almost a decade to come since 2001 when the Government of India had succeeded in botching up the attempt of the Dalit Rights Group together with the broader civil society to make caste based discrimination an aspect of racial discrimination at the Durban World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. The Government of India claimed the caste issues as ‘internal matter of India’ and asserted that they were making all attempts to put an end to caste based discrimination. What it forgot in doing that was its own, and glorious, role in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. If caste issues are an internal matter of India, would not apartheid be an internal issue of the governments of apartheid-era South Africa? So why did India play a crucial role in mobilising the world opinion against apartheid?

The government of India tried to further substantiate its claim by asserting the caste issues as intra-racial and intra-cultural even while conceding the existence of discrimination. Soli Sorabjee, the then Attorney General of India, maintained that the only reason behind India’s attempt to keep caste discrimination off the agenda of Durban Conference was that “it will distract participants from the main topic: racism”. Even while conceding that caste discrimination in India is ‘undeniable’ he stressed that ‘caste and race are entirely different’.

It could very well be. After all, no two systems of social stratification in this world are absolutely similar to each other. A lot of factors, from culture to economy, intercede with the systems of stratification to produce the division of power and hierarchy in the society and make the systems, in the process, absolutely distinct from one another in internal structure. The crucial question, however, is not about their distinctiveness but their efficacy in maintaining and safeguarding social hierarchies.

Sadly, Indian caste system has proved itself to be one of the worst, if not the worst, system of social stratification for maintaining and perpetuating social hierarchies. Most probably, humankind has never devised a more comprehensive system of keeping a section of society under perpetual subjugation amidst inhuman conditions. It has never devised a worse way of dehumanising fellow human beings and reducing them to being mere labour force devoid of any dignity leave aside rights. Everything said and done, when it comes to committing atrocities on people, the caste system has proved itself to be far more clinical in brutalising its victims than race and not less.

The argument of the Indian government that caste based discrimination should not be included under the category of racial discrimination because it is making serious progress in the issue by having protective laws and positive discrimination fails miserable in the wake of data produced by its own agencies.

For example, the number of crimes against people belonging to the Scheduled Castes as per records of the National Crime Records Bureau of India, a body of ministry of Home Affairs, went up to 33615, an increase of more than 2 percent from the preceding year. Or the fact that the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act does not get applied even in such ghoulis cases of caste based atrocities as in the killing of a Dalit family in Khairlanji while committing brutal rapes on the women speaks volumes about the seriousness of the efforts of the government. The second argument of Indian government, unfortunately backed by a few leading sociologists, was that since 'race' is a not a meaningful biological category in India and all attempts of profiling different castes along racial lines have fallen flat. Their claim is that even if caste is based on descent it is entirely different from race.

Even if the discrimination against the Dalits is intra-racial, the consequences for them are no less brutal than that in racism. On a more fundamental level, the lack of 'scientific' evidence may prove the absence of 'race' in India but not the absence of 'racism', an ideological structure based on the belief of superiority of some people because of birth and inferiority of others because

of the same! And there is no doubt that this ideology is becoming stronger day by day despite all the attempts of Indian government to put an end to this 'evil' practice.

The seriousness of the government on the issue speaks for itself in its acts. After all, the government's dogged opposition to the inclusion of caste based discrimination does not come out of some failure to understand the ground realities out of sheer ignorance. It reflects the mindset and the psyche of the government and the people manning it. The stand of the government emanates from that pre-modern, barbaric and regressive social structure of caste that rules the country under its democratic façade. A facade that gets exposed more often than not by the deeds of all organs of the state, including its judiciary.

It is hard to believe that even judiciary can do that but even a cursory glance on its track records bear out the fact. Be it the highly misogynist and casteist verdict in Mathura rape case ((Tukaram V. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 185) when the Supreme Court overruled the decision of the Bombay High Court convicting two policemen for raping Mathura, a 16-year-old girl because of the fact that the girl was an 'illiterate and orphaned tribal girl' and was of loose character by implication to the recent verdict of Maharashtra High Court in Khairlanji massacre, the judiciary has proved itself complicit in letting the government off its responsibility of abolishing caste based discrimination.

At times, unfortunately, it has went all the distance to be part of the perpetrators ad not only accomplices of caste discrimination. Like in the infamous and stinking observation of the trial judge in the Bhanwari Devi rape case in 1995 that because Hindu scriptures do not allow upper caste men to touch a low caste woman, the accused could not have raped the Dalit victim. This case and many others have put our constitution to shame.

And that is why, compartmentalising the issue of caste into the 'scientific' and 'cultural' aspects and then prioritising the scientific ones to assert that caste is not race is not only incorrect but in fact a deceitful attempt to violate the spirit of the constitution of India if not the letters itself, and should be fought against from within and outside.

As a matter of fact, the meaning of the term 'descent' has been expanded to include 'discrimination based on caste' ,by the general recommendation number 29, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 1969. Indian government will do well to remember that it is a signatory to that convention along with more than 170 other countries.

It will also do well to take note of the fact that the lives of more than 165 million citizens is not a question of intellectual theorising over whether race is caste or not before putting its act together and cracking down on all forms of caste atrocities decisively. By then, it can begin with accepting that caste is a form of racial discrimination, at least of racism if not of the 'pure' (in the Brahminical sense) biological category of race!

Meanwhile, lets us all support the British Dalits in safeguarding their hard won victory against the demon of caste, threatened by the right wing Hindu organisation in Britain as well as Indian government which is, reportedly, trying to arm-twist the British government into not intervening in its 'internal' matter. Making that absurd claim amounts to appropriating anything relating to Hindu religion as 'internal' and caste serious aspersions on the secular credentials of Indian state. Does Indian government want to claim that all issues concerning Hindus are its 'internal' issues, throwing all its secular pretensions away?

After all, caste based atrocities have long ceased to confine themselves in Indian subcontinent. If the gory facts about honour killings taking place in Britain and Canada among other places were not proof enough, the recent killing of a Sikh religious leader belong to the Ravidasi sect (a Dalit sect) in Vienna leaves no scope for doubts about the same.

We can begin by standing by the policy and reminding the Indian government not to meddle in the internal issues of Britain, as it is dealing with an issue concerning its citizens and has nothing to do with a 'secular' India. Further, no government can sit idle when caste issues lead to illegal confinements, abductions, forced marriages, and even killings. It is the Indian state which has failed to contain the demon of caste, leave aside killing it, and it has no right to demand the same indifference and disdain for human life from a sovereign state for such a pressing issue.

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## **Stop Press**

### **Geelani and Arundhati Roy booked under Sedition Charges**

*Delhi Police have booked the Chairman of All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Booker Prize winner and noted Indian social activist, Arundhati Roy along with many others on charges of sedition for their speech at a seminar on Kashmir.*

# **Geelani: We are Pakistanis; Pakistan is Ours**

Asad Sufi

## **Achieving all the objectives of the Pakistan Movement:**

The path to success and accomplishment is never even or straight. Those who give up early can never succeed. And Pakistan deserves credit for not giving up early despite inept and often corrupt leadership. Among the stalwarts who enthused the people of Pakistan was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who gets credit for pulling Pakistan together after the defeat in East Pakistan and bringing the country to centre stage as a vehicle of Muslim unity with the help of well established leaders of the time – Late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and Colonel Kaddafi of Libya. He is the one who started the nuclear programme in 1974 when India carried out its first nuclear test and stood up against almost universal opposition. His successors deserve credit for sustaining progress despite US sanctions. That Pakistan is the first Muslim country to become a nuclear weapon state is no mean achievement. The Kashmiris are just as proud as the people of Pakistan. The Kashmiris demonstrated that Pakistan is theirs as well.

Much reviled ‘military dictator’ Zia ul Haq was instrumental in the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan that eventually led to its disintegration and six Muslim countries – five Central Asia Republics and Azerbaijan – securing sovereign freedom . The US victory in the Cold War would have been impossible without Pakistan and the USA working together. While all the leaders of Pakistan including the nincompoops who rule it today have been aware of the importance of congruence of interests between the USA and Pakistan in South and Central Asia, the US establishment is divided on this issue. India is on the side of those in the US who underline the danger from ‘Islamists’ rather than the value of having Muslims on their side.

As for evolving a model polity for a Muslim nation state, Pakistan has covered a lot of distance during the ‘lawyer’s movement’ that secured the restoration of the judges dismissed by Musharraf who Zardari also did not want to restore. It is now recognised by the intelligentsia in Pakistan that ‘good governance’ is not the product of democracy; it may even be undermined by the political class that democracy brings to power in many countries like India and Pakistan. Good governance depends more on the ‘rule of law’. Pakistani political class is corrupt and is therefore focussed on

avoiding being held to account for its crimes. They are afraid that if the judicial system operated effectively and justly they would be in jail rather than in the halls of power. Since 1973, all governments – civil as well as military – have been successful in making the institutions of the state ineffective. They abolished the ‘neutrality and security of tenure of the civil services’ to make the civil servants no different from private servants of politicians. They undermined the independence of the judiciary – the civilian rulers by legislation to give them control over judicial appointment, and the military by forcing the high judiciary to justify the rule of the Army Chief invoking the dubious ‘doctrine of necessity’

The military itself escaped atrophy - one because its chief was also the chief executive of the country and two because the service chiefs of the armed forces never tolerated interference in promotions and appointments. That the military is resented so much and so unanimously by the political class is therefore quite understandable. But the political class has not given up; another Nawaz Sharif may yet appoint another Musharraf and the whole country suffers. But the fact remains that it is the interest of the military that the country is governed well and it is willing and able to take measures when other institutions collapse or come under foreign influence or control.

I believe that Pakistan’s rich and varied experience in seeking to develop a model polity equips it to articulate one. This is not difficult. A polity does not define a system of government; it defines the principle of national solidarity of a state. All the fifty six Muslim nation states have different systems of government. It is impossible to find even two states which have exactly the same system of governance. But all fifty six of them have the same polity – Islam. It is not the result of anything Pakistan has done. But there is reason for quiet satisfaction in Pakistan that it is so.

Ironically, the growing solidarity between Muslim nation states has led to encouragement of non-state actors to espouse fringe ideas that makes it easy to revile Islam and Muslims. There is apparently great anxiety in the world today over threat from the Islamists, from nuclear weapons in the hands of Muslims, and the ‘liberation movements of long standing like that in Palestine and Kashmir? USA has grouped all these together in politically correct terms of ‘terrorism’ and ‘nuclear proliferation’. How can anyone be for terrorism or proliferation? The Muslims need to respond. They must assert ‘how can anyone be for injustice, for betrayal of solemn promises and violation of international law’. The people of Jammu and Kashmir and Palestine are the victims of injustice and betrayal in clear violation of international law. As long as injustice and betrayal are sustained, violence will be justified and just as sustained.

What Syed Ali Shah Geelani has done is to claim ownership of the Pakistan Movement for which the Pakistanis are just as grateful as the people of Jammu and Kashmir. But there is a bigger challenge facing him and 'his Pakistan'. The movement in Kashmir is reviled in India and the West as 'Islamist and terrorist'. They have to be able to show and demonstrate that it is a movement against 'Injustice, Betrayal, and Violation of International law'. Resistance is a lawful response to any one let alone all three. Resistance in Kashmir is not only legitimate; it is the duty of every Pakistani – whether living in Kashmir or Pakistan.

## **Amnesty International**

### **Dr Binayak Sen's Conviction And Life Sentence Mock Justice**

The life sentence handed down against Dr Binayak Sen by a court in the India state of Chhattisgarh violates international fair trial standards and is likely to enflame tensions in the conflict-affected area, Amnesty International said today.

Dr Binayak Sen was convicted of sedition and conspiracy under the Chhattisgarh Special Public Safety Act, 2005, and the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 2004. India's central government has acknowledged that the intensifying armed conflict with the Maoists in central India is a reflection of serious inequities and a history of human rights violations in the area. Amnesty International believes that the charges against Dr Sen are baseless and politically motivated; Dr Binyak Sen is a pioneer of health care to marginalized and indigenous communities in Chhattisgarh, where the state police and armed Maoists have been engaged in clashes over the last seven years. He has reported on unlawful killings of Adivasis (Indigenous People) by the police and by Salwa Judum, a private militia widely held to be sponsored by the state authorities to fight the armed Maoists.

*Love and serve the poor. That is the crime Dr. Binayak Sen is guilty of. Dirt, disease, starvation and poverty filled districts of Chhattisgarh. The wretched place cries, it shrieks for attention. And as an individual, Dr. Sen dedicated the best part of his life giving precisely that. Attention and care. Indeed, like Christ, Dr. Sen was a healer. (Editor)*

## India Plays Hardball with China

Harsh V Pant

After a year of turmoil in Sino-Indian relations, India hosted Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao last week with a degree of fanfare. Wen's visit came at a time of newfound assertiveness in *India's China policy*. Having tried to brush *significant divergences* with Beijing under the carpet for years, New Delhi policymakers have been forced to acknowledge -- if grudgingly so -- that the relationship with China has become increasingly contentious. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh suggested just a few weeks ago that "China would like to have a foothold in South Asia and we have to reflect on this reality. . . . It's important to be prepared." India has also adopted a harder line on Tibet in recent weeks, making it clear that it expects China to reciprocate on Jammu and Kashmir. In the past, India has respected Chinese sensitivities on Tibet and Taiwan.

Ignoring pressures from Beijing, India also decided to take part in the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony for the Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo in Oslo. Beijing asked several countries, including India, to boycott the ceremony or risk facing its displeasure, describing the prize as open support for criminal activities in China. India was among the 44 states that did decide to participate, while Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq were among those that did not attend. There were even rumours that Wen might cancel his India trip in response, but they proved unfounded.

India had flagged a number of concerns before the visit. The most significant involve issues impinging on India's sovereignty, such as the *Chinese presence* in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Beijing's issuance of stapled visas to Indians entering China from Jammu and Kashmir. India had also expressed its concerns about the upstream dams Beijing is building on shared rivers, like the Brahmaputra, and the trade barriers Indian companies face in China. India is keen on gaining access to Chinese markets, especially in the area of pharmaceuticals, information technology and engineering goods, sectors in which India argues its companies face non-tariff barriers in China.

These issues notwithstanding, there was no shortage of warm words during the visit. In a lecture in New Delhi, Wen invoked Mahatma Gandhi as "a man of love and integrity" who "has always lived in my heart." He underlined that though recent Sino-Indian relations have experienced major

twists and turns, they were only a short episode in a 2,000-year history of friendly bilateral exchanges. India's External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna reciprocated by suggesting that the two nations do not see any contradiction in each other's rise and understands the importance to leverage growth and development through mutual cooperation.

The substantive diplomatic outcomes of the trip, however, were underwhelming. Wen refused to acknowledge *Indian concerns* over the Jammu and Kashmir visa question and the growing Chinese presence in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and also failed to condemn terrorist groups operating from Pakistan to target India. China has also so far refrained from supporting India's campaign to win a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. For its part, India decided to play hardball on the issues of importance to China. New Delhi, in a first, decided not to reiterate its support for the "One China" policy and refused to explicitly state its recognition of the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of Chinese territory.

As in the past, in the absence of any political convergence, economic ties ended up being the focus of the visit. Wen came to India with a group of around 300 Chinese executives, and *business deals worth about \$16 billion were signed* in a variety of sectors, including farm products and pharmaceuticals. The two sides also set a target of \$100 billion for bilateral trade by 2015, up from the present \$60 billion. But there was no progress on a bilateral trade agreement, as India remains concerned about its growing trade deficit with China\*.

"We are friends, not rivals," Wen said in India. But a growing number of Indians now see China, if not as a rival, then at least as a competitor. More damagingly, a perception is gaining ground that among the major global powers, China is the only one that does not accept India as a rising global player that needs to be accommodated in the global political order. Tensions between the two neighbours remain deep-seated, and their increasing economic strength and rising geopolitical standing have given rise to rapidly growing ambition on both sides.

Though China now possesses more strategic resources -- both economic and military -- than at any time in the recent past, it is not entirely clear if Beijing has well-defined policy objectives vis-à-vis India. Indeed, for quite some time, India has not been a significant priority in China's foreign-policy calculus. There was even a general perception in Beijing that India could be easily pushed around, as New Delhi's past eagerness to keep relations smooth at all costs reinforced the Chinese assumption that Indian interest could be challenged without incurring any cost.

New Delhi's newfound toughness in its dealings with Beijing signals that certain red lines remain non-negotiable. What remains to be seen is how far New Delhi is willing to go to hold these lines against the rising Chinese juggernaut.

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## **Water – The Most Important Strategic Resource in South Asia**

There are worrying statistics that Pakistan is "on the brink of a water disaster" where availability of water is persistently declining: 60 years ago it was 5000 cubic metres per capita which has come down to 1200 cubic metres per capita in 2009 and is estimated to fall to about 800 cubic metres per capita in 2020.

Pakistan is geographically a lower riparian state and the major source rivers of the Indus basin are in the Indian Held 'Kashmir', hence the linkage of the two issues water and Kashmir. On Pakistan side this issue has not been handled imaginatively and the existing resource management can be improved considerably.

Water issue is also directly linked with energy crisis in Pakistan and the combined effect of these could lead to major upheavals and become a major driver of war and conflict engulfing the entire region.

The current state of crisis apart, Pakistan and India have experienced roadblocks with reference to the Indus Water Treaty (IWT). The first one was about the Wullar Barrage (India calls it Tulbul navigation project) that emerged in 1985. India wanted to construct a barrage on Jhelum River near the town of Sopore but Pakistan had severe objections and the matter stayed unresolved in the Indus Waters Commission. The second was about the Baglihar dam that India wanted to build on Chenab River in 1991 which as stated above was settled by a neutral expert though with some reservations from Pakistani side. The third is of course the ongoing Kishanganga hydro project on Neelam River. Scores of other dams and projects are of serious concern to Pakistan.

## **Eviction of Khaleda Zia: How can we hide our shame?**

**Mohammad Zainal Abedin**

Bangladeshis in home and abroad, even the conscious section of the international community, were stunned seeing the process of evicting Begum Khaleda Zia from her Dhaka Cantonment house on November 14, 2010, though her legal fight was yet to be settled in the Court. Khaleda Zia was not an intruder or illegal occupant of that house. It was a gift to her by the highest authority of the country. There was no controversy over the house before Sheikh Hasina came to power for the second time in 2009. It was incumbent government that initiated and imposed the problem not only on the late President Zia family, but also on the whole nation as a whole. The whole nation will have to bear this curse or scar for years to come. Its symptom has already started. BNP imposed a successful dawn to dusk general strike just on the following day, November 14, 2010 and also declared wage stern movement after the Eid-ul Azha, a Muslim religious festivals that celebration comes off in Bangladesh on November 17. It means Bangladesh is going to experience another traumatic havoc in near future.

Our adversaries relentlessly manipulate to divide and rule us, to use one group of us against the other in a bid to occur a civil war. Many tragic tempests were blown over us since we attain our independence in 1971. These tempests presented us one party rule, army rule, state of emergency, throwing of grenades or shootings in political rallies, killings of two of our presidents and now the massacre in BDR. All these were manipulated, so that the armed forces of India can enter our country for the second time under the cover of restoring peace. First time they did in 1971. Our adversary, having failed to reach its goal, is more vigorous than ever before.

National unity and consensus were the only remedies to thwart such design. But, now it seems to be a far cry. Bangladesh is now the most divided nation in the world. The policymakers of the incumbent government unfortunately initiated unprecedented division. In a bid to crush its political rivals, the government resurrected series of resolved controversies that throw the opposition to the extreme extent. The government speaks for democracy in words but practice autocracy in deeds. Such contradictory behaviour is a danger signal to democracy. Such behaviour may instigate a section of people to emerge as extremists when their democratic rights are denied or

they are persecuted. Government uses the language of arms and behaviour in such harsh way, as if, it invite its opponents to take confrontational line.

The way the government vacated Begum Khaleda Zia from her house, where she lived for 40 years, is a curse for our nation. It shows how revengeful our leaders are! It unveils to what ugly extent they can go to teach their political rival. The action that the incumbent government took against a former prime minister simply lowered down our head and degraded our image and proved us a worthless nation.

No explanation is enough to justify government's eviction process. Government explanation and exaggerations failed to convince the sensible people. People question why no previous governments, even Hasina, raise the issue when she attained power in 1996. For this reason, her present move is branded as highly revengeful step that failed to attract people's support and sympathy.

Process of evicting her uncovers that fact that the government intentionally and deliberately manipulated this tragic drama. Government, even ISPR claimed that Khaleda Zia willingly left her house, and she was not forcibly evicted. But the entire scenario disproved such claims.

Why Khaleda Zia was kept isolated from the rest of the world during the operation. Why members of her family, even the maids and house-servants were escorted to unknown locations? Why her relatives, party leaders and activists, or lawyers were not allowed to meet her? Why journalists were not allowed to see her in persons or the scenario of the operation. Why her land-phone line was disconnected? Why the law enforcing agencies during the operation set up 'frequency jamming machine' on that house so that Begum Khaleda Zia cannot communicate to her party leaders or relatives? Why the journalists were taken to the house on the following day? Why there was no magistrate during the eviction process? Why no list was prepared whatever Begum Zia took away from her house or left behind? What was the problem of allowing BNP leaders, or lawyers, or journalists, or close relatives, to remain present while she was leaving at her own, not by force? Why ISPR was used against Begum Khaleda Zia?

ISPR is not a mouthpiece of the government. But the language and spirit of the ISPR statement represents government version of the entire drama of eviction. The language and argument of the ISPR represent government sentiment. The tone of the statement indirectly threatened Khaleda Zia. ISPR or Army is not a party to this most tricky and controversial decision and step of the government. It was a government sponsored problem. It was a government decision that used the Cantonment Board to start the process.

Khaleda Zia went to the Court and the government attorneys, not anyone engaged by ISPR or Cantonment Board faced the hearings. It was the government determination to evict Khaleda Zia from her house in the name of the implementing Court verdict.

I strongly believe ISPR did not voluntarily make this statement. Since the BDR massacre the establishment has become subservient to the wishes of India through their surrogate Hasina. It was instructed to undesirably participate in the most tricky and controversial issue. Since the inception of the Bangladesh Armed Forces hectic intrigues are in operation to bring the Army and the people face to face in order to wither away its existence. ISPR statement was made not only to undermine the image of Khaleda Zia, but also antagonize pro-BNP supporters against Army.

The ISPR was also used to incite the Army against BNP, as it was mentioned in the statement that she scolded the Army during the eviction operation. If Khaleda Zia scolded anyone, let its records be released. It is not so difficult to record anyone's voice. Even a tiny mobile set can record any voice. Khaleda Zia's party BNP claimed, there no Army officer during the evict operation. Khaleda Zia wanted to get an Army officer to talk to her. No Army personnel were available to talk to her. The reality is that Army was not a party to this unfortunate controversy. So Khaleda Zia knows it well that there was no scope her part to speak ill of Army.

The action of the government not only violated the norms of democracy, but also the human rights and legal process of the country. It unveils misuse of power, which is threat to democracy and social stability. It may cause normalcy and lead the country to uncertainty and economic bankruptcy. It is difficult to say to what direction the eviction issue influence Bangladesh politics whether Bangladesh is going to experience another 1/11 or foreign intervention under the cover of protecting the incumbent government or restoring normalcy, as Pranab Mukharjee, the former foreign minister of India has already threatened that India will not sit idle if Sheikh Hasina government is disturbed.

*Mohammad Zainal Abedin is a Bangladeshi journalists and researcher.*

# Water and National Security

Ahmer Bilal Soofi

*Water issue between India and Pakistan is a time bomb that needs to be addressed immediately, seriously and earnestly. Water, it seems, is on top of the agenda on the Pakistani side of the border, relegating even Kashmir to a second position. Water shall become the real bone of contention and all the rest shall become secondary. Pakistan government and the political leadership have remained negligent in respect of serious research on the water issue but the time has come to redress and to make up for this default. (Editor)*

Let's give credit where it is due: the Indus Waters Treaty is a unique legal instrument and well-negotiated in the context of circumstances as they existed in 1960. It has survived at least two wars and, in fact, its continuation is viewed as a legal basis to make determination that the so-called war of 1965 was not a 'war' instead an armed conflict -- because the Indus Waters Treaty was not cancelled by the parties and hence it was concluded, by a commercial arbitrator, that the 1965 war was actually an 'armed conflict'.

We are now in 2010. The debate India is violating the Indus Waters Treaty has heated up again. The military strategists view blocking of water by the Indians as one of the justifications to seriously contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, intelligent handling is crucial for the peace and mutual benefit of the two nuclear armed states. After all it is a sensitive relationship of an upper riparian and lower riparian -- of water distribution, water scarcity and preservation of water resource.

I fear this debate may not be handled intelligently by the two sides; particularly Pakistani -- because firstly, it has already been made a political issue by the political forces against India and secondly, the scholarship on Indus Waters Treaty is almost non-existent here.

This is shocking. Pakistan's survival is based on water -- and yet since 1960 there is no organised or institutional initiative to carry out proper research on the implementation of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty. The occasional reports by the government entities like the Ministry of Water and Power, projects

study for reservoirs, occasional reports by consultants co-opted by the Ministry are not enough. Unfortunately, in Pakistan collection of facts and data are considered to be "research" when this is only a small part in developing a complete picture: Year-wise data of water flowing into Pakistan, its collection and tabulation either through the ministry or through the Indus Water Commissioner is deemed to be sufficient work done to handle the water resource issue of Pakistan.

The fact of the matter is that Pakistan needs to thoroughly research issues associated with upper/lower riparian states, such as to examine the legal modules developed in Europe, North America, Africa and Far East on upper/lower riparian states and assess their application to the Indo-Pak model; collect decisions and awards of arbitration amongst various countries to identify the directions in which international jurisprudence on water disputes is moving; collect all bilateral treaties of upper/lower riparian states to ascertain if the Indus Waters Treaty has fallen behind time or how can one innovatively use the existing provisions of the treaty.

It is interesting that Pakistan has never convincingly argued that notwithstanding the bilateral commitment under Indus Waters Treaty, India has an obligation towards Pakistan to preserve water in its catchment areas for the benefit of lower riparian use -- that is, Pakistan. Importantly, this obligation is under the principles of customary international law.

It can be argued that even if there is no Indus Waters Treaty, India is still under an obligation to let considerable water flow into Pakistan. The 1992 Convention on protection of trans-boundary water courses and 1997 Convention on the law of non-navigational uses of international water courses can serve as useful modules and codification of international laws as declared by the International Court of Justice in 1997. Particularly since the conventions support Pakistan's version.

It is believed that water sharing compels the upper/lower riparian states to coordinate water distributions -- and so "water unites". Regrettably, instead of taking the course of getting closer on account of water sharing issues, India and Pakistan are drifting in opposite direction of the "water divides".

Pakistan needs to focus on research on water laws. A group of legal experts need to examine the legal aspects of the water sharing treaties, the development of water laws with emphasis on obligations of an upper riparian state and assess cases of national and international courts. Such a group may be formed outside the government system -- to carry out in depth research on the issue and then make recommendations to the Federal government/Mofa. This research work may also help Pakistan highlight the

legally justifiable points before the US government, EU and other international players.

Given water is a national security issue; there should be multiple initiatives of research essentially conducted by water or legal experts. Possibly, a few persons can be sent abroad to specialise on rights and obligations of upper/lower riparian states.

What Pakistan needs to focus on is that India continues to build hydro projects and dams, as they are technically permitted under the Treaty, but in the process the 'spirit' of the Treaty of 'satisfactory utilisation of the waters' is getting defeated. The rivers in Pakistan are visibly getting dry. Water flow has become scarce. Thus, the 'spirit' of the Treaty needs to be revived and pressed as an issue having preference over technical compliance of the Treaty.

During negotiations with India on the issue, Pakistan has so far only put the Indus Waters Treaty on the table -- as a basis to claim its share and to assert its right -- whereas it needs to put along on the same table a stack of material, legal references, conventions that place additional obligations on India to ensure that Pakistan as a lower riparian state is entitled to proper share of water. The time has come to redress and to make up for the default otherwise we as a nation will continue to suffer.

## **Facts Speak**

### **Acute Poverty in India Worse than Africa**

More people are mired in poverty in eight Indian states than in the 26 poorest African countries, according to a new UN-backed measure of poverty. The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) looks beyond income at a wider range of household-level deprivation.

The study found that half of the world's MPI poor people live in South Asia, and just over a quarter in Africa.

There are 421 million MPI poor people in eight Indian states alone -- Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal -- and 410 million in the 26 poorest African countries combined.

## 1971 Rare Facts

Sarmila Bose

There is much for Pakistan to come to terms with what happened in 1971. But the answers don't lie in unthinking vilification of the fighting men who performed so well in the war against such heavy odds in defence of the national policy. Rather, in failing to honour them, The nation dishonours itself

My introduction to international politics was 1971, as a schoolgirl in Calcutta. Many images from that year are still etched in my mind, but the culminating one was the photo on Ramna racecourse of two men sitting at a table — the smart, turbaned Sikh, 'our' war-hero, Jagjit Singh Aurora, and the large man in a beret, A A K Niazi, commander of the other side, signing the instrument of surrender. Nearly a generation later, a chance interview for the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) with Lt Gen. Aurora took me back to 1971. The interview was not about 1971, but about injustices suffered by Sikhs at the hands of the state General Aurora had served. I thought he was a bigger hero for what he had to say then. That view was reinforced as I read — with incredulity — the disparaging remarks by other Indian officers about him, and each other, in their books. If this is what happened to the winning commander, I wondered what had happened to the other man in the photo. The result was a revelation.

It turns out that General Niazi has been my 'enemy' since the Second World War. As Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army fought on the Burma front in 1943-45 in their quest for India's freedom, Niazi was fighting on the other side, for the British Indian Army, under the overall command of General (later Field Marshal) William Joseph Slim. Slim and his 14th Army halted the advance of the INA and the Japanese at the Imphal campaign and turned the course of the war

In the process of inflicting military defeat upon my ancestor, Niazi's performance was so exceptional that the British awarded him an on-the-spot Military Cross for action on the Assam-Burma front in June 1944. On another occasion they wanted to award a DSO, but he was too junior, so a Mention in Despatches was recorded. In the original record of his MC signed by his commanding officers all the way up to Slim, which I obtained from the British Ministry of Defence, the British commanders describe Niazi's gallantry in detail: "He organized the attack with such skill that his

leading platoon succeeded in achieving complete surprise over the enemy.” They speak of how he personally led his men, the ‘great skill and coolness’ under fire with which he changed tactics with changing circumstances, created diversionary attacks, extricated his wounded, defeated the enemy and withdrew his men by section, remaining personally at the rear in every case.

The British honoured Niazi for “personal leadership, bravery and complete disregard for his own personal safety.” On 15 December 1944 the Viceroy Lord Wavell flew to Imphal and in the presence of Lord Mountbatten knighted Slim and his corps commanders Stopford, Scoones and Christison. Only two ‘Indian’ officers were chosen to be decorated by the Viceroy at the ceremony – ‘Tiger’ Niazi was one of them.

In 1971 Niazi was a highly decorated Pakistani general, twice receiving the Hilal-e-Jurat. He was sent to East Pakistan in April 1971 — part of a sorry tradition in South Asia of political rulers attempting to find military solutions to political problems. By then Tikka Khan had already launched the crackdown of 25 March for which he has been known to Bengalis as the ‘butcher of Bengal’ ever since. The population of East Bengal was completely hostile and Pakistan condemned around the world.

Authoritative scholarly analyses of 1971 are rare. The best work is Richard Sisson and Leo Rose’s *War and Secession*

Robert Jackson, fellow of All Soul’s College, Oxford, wrote an account shortly after the events. Most of the principal participants did not write about it, a notable exception being Gen. Niazi’s recent memoirs (1998). Some Indian officers have written books of uneven quality — they make for an embarrassing read for what the Indians have to say about one another.

However, a consistent picture emerges from the more objective accounts of the war. Sisson and Rose describe how India started assisting Bengali rebels since April, but “the Mukti Bahini had not been able to prevent the Pakistani army from regaining control over all the major urban centres on the East Pakistani-Indian border and even establishing a tenuous authority in most of the rural areas.” From July to October there was direct involvement of Indian military personnel. “...mid-October to 20 November... Indian artillery was used much more extensively in support ...and Indian military forces, including tanks and air power on a few occasions, were also used...Indian units were withdrawn to Indian territory once their objectives had been brought under the control of the Mukti Bahini — though at times this was only for short periods, as, to the irritation of the Indians, the Mukti Bahini

forces rarely held their ground when the Pakistani army launched a counterattack.”

Clearly, the Pakistani army regained East Pakistan for their masters in Islamabad by April-May, creating an opportunity for a political settlement, and held off both Bengali guerrillas and their Indian supporters till November, buying more time — time and opportunity that Pakistan’s rulers and politicians failed to utilise.

Contrary to Indian reports, full-scale war between India and Pakistan started in East Bengal on 21 November, making it a four-week war rather than a ‘lightning campaign’. Sisson and Rose state bluntly: “After the night of 21 November...Indian forces did not withdraw. From 21 to 25 November several Indian army divisions...launched simultaneous military actions on all of the key border regions of East Pakistan, and from all directions, with both armoured and air support.” Indian officers like Sukhwant Singh and Lachhman Singh write quite openly in their books about India invading East Pakistani territory in November, which they knew was ‘an act of war.

None of the outside scholars expected the Eastern garrison to withstand a full Indian invasion. On the contrary, Pakistan’s longstanding strategy was “the defence of the east is in the west”. Jackson writes, “Pakistani forces had largely withdrawn from scattered border-protection duties into cleverly fortified defensive positions at the major centres inside the frontiers, where they held all the major ‘place names’ against Mukti Bahini attacks, and blocked the routes of entry from India.”

Sisson and Rose point out the incongruity of Islamabad tolerating India’s invasion of East Pakistani territory in November. On 30 November Niazi received a message from General Hamid stating, “The whole nation is proud of you and you have their full support.” The same day Islamabad decided to launch an attack in the West on 2 December, later postponed to 3 December, after a two-week wait, but did not inform the Eastern command about it. According to Jackson, the Western offensive was frustrated by 10 December.

Though futile, the Western offensive allowed India to openly invade the East, with overwhelming advantages. “...despite all these advantages, the war did not go as smoothly and easily for the Indian army...”, but Sisson and Rose come to the balanced judgment that “The Pakistanis fought hard and well; the Indian army won an impressive victory.” Even Indian officers concede the personal bravery of Niazi and the spirited fight put up by the Pakistanis in the East. That the troops fought so well against such

overwhelming odds is a credit both to them, and to their commanders, for an army does not fight well in the absence of good leadership.

However, as Jackson put it, "...India's success was inevitable from the moment the general war broke out — unless diplomatic intervention could frustrate it." As is well known, Pakistan failed to secure military or diplomatic intervention. Sisson and Rose also say, "The outcome of the conflict on the eastern front after 6 December was not in doubt, as the Indian military had all the advantages." On 14 December Niazi received the following message from Yahya Khan: "You have fought a heroic battle against overwhelming odds. The nation is proud of you ...You have now reached a stage where further resistance is no longer humanly possible nor will it serve any useful purpose... You should now take all necessary measures to stop the fighting and preserve the lives of armed forces personnel, all those from West Pakistan and all loyal elements..." Sisson and Rose naturally describe this message as "implying that the armed forces in East Pakistan should surrender".

No matter how traumatic the outcome of 1971 for Pakistan, the Eastern command did not create the conflict, nor were they responsible for the failure of the political and diplomatic process. Sent to do the dirty work of the political manoeuvres, the fighting men seem to have performed remarkably well against overwhelming odds. It is shocking therefore to discover that they were not received with honour by their nation on their return. Their commander, Niazi, appears to have been singled out, along with one aide, to be punished arbitrarily with dismissal and denial of pension, without being given the basic right to defend himself through a court martial, which he asked for.

The commission set up allegedly to examine what had happened in 1971 was too flawed in its terms of reference and report to have any international credibility. However, even its recommendations of holding public trials and court-martials were ignored. There is much for Pakistan to come to terms with what happened in 1971. But the answers don't lie in unthinking vilification of the fighting men who performed so well in the war against such heavy odds in defence of the national policy. Rather, in failing to honour them, the nation dishonours itself.

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# **Killing Each Taliban Soldier Costs \$50 Million**

Matthew Nasuti

*Killing 20 Taliban costs \$1 Billion / Killing all the Taliban would cost \$1.7 Trillion*

The Pentagon will not tell the public what it costs to locate, target and kill a single Taliban soldier because the price-tag is so scandalously high that it makes the Taliban appear to be Super-Soldiers. As set out in this article, the estimated cost to kill each Taliban is as high as \$100 million, with a conservative estimate being \$50 million. A public discussion should be taking place in the United States regarding whether the Taliban have become too expensive an enemy to defeat. Each month the Pentagon generates a ream of dubious statistics designed to create the illusion of progress in Afghanistan. In response this author decided to compile his own statistics. As the goal of any war is to kill the enemy, the idea was to calculate what it actually costs to kill just one of the enemy. The obstacles encountered in generating such a statistic are formidable. The problem is that the Pentagon continues to illegally classify all negative war news and embarrassing information. Regardless, some information has been collected from independent sources. Here is what we know in summary and round numbers:

1. Taliban field Strength: 35000 troops.
2. Taliban Killed Per Year by Coalition forces: 2,000 (best available information)
3. Pentagon Direct Costs for Afghan War for 2010: \$100 billion
4. Pentagon Indirect Costs for Afghan War for year 2010: \$100 billion

Using the fact that 2,000 Taliban are being killed each year and that the Pentagon spends \$200 billion per year on the war in Afghanistan, one simply has to divide one number into the other. That calculation reveals that \$100 million is being spent to kill each Taliban soldier. In order to be conservative, the author decided to double the number of Taliban being killed each year by U.S. and NATO forces (although the likelihood of such being true is unlikely). This reduces the cost to kill each Taliban to \$50 million, which is the title of this article. The final number is outrageously high regardless of how one calculates it.

To put this information another way, using the conservative estimate of \$50 million to kill each Taliban: It costs the American taxpayers \$1 billion to kill 20 Taliban. As the U.S. military estimates there to be 35,000 hard-core Taliban and assuming that no reinforcements and replacements will arrive from Pakistan and Iran: Just killing the existing Taliban would cost \$1.75 Trillion.

The reason for these exorbitant costs is that United States has the world's most mechanized, computerized, weaponized and synchronized military, not to mention the most pampered (at least at Forward Operating Bases). An estimated 150,000 civilian contractors support, protect, feed and cater to the American personnel in Afghanistan, which is an astonishing number. The Americans enjoy such perks and distinctions in part because no other country is willing to pay (waste) so much money on their military.

The ponderous American war machine is a logistics nightmare and a maintenance train wreck. It is also part-myth. This author served at a senior level within the U.S. Air Force. Air Force "smart" bombs are no way near as consistently accurate as the Pentagon boasts; Army mortars remain inaccurate; even standard American field rifles are frequently outmatched by Taliban weapons, which have a longer range. The American public would pale if it actually learned the full story about the poor quality of the weapons and equipment that are being purchased with its tax dollars. The Taliban's best ally within the United States may be the Pentagon, whose contempt for fiscal responsibility and accountability may force a premature U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as the Americans cannot continue to fund these Pentagon excesses.

If President Obama refuses to drastically reform the Pentagon's inefficient way of making war, he may conclude that the Taliban is simply too expensive an enemy to fight. He would then have little choice but to abandon the Afghan people to the Taliban's "Super-Soldiers." That would be an intolerable disgrace.

The problem is not simply within the Pentagon. The hapless U.S. State Department is equally to blame. It: -

1. Continues to sit on the sidelines of this war;
2. Refused for nine years to deploy an adequate number of civilian experts;
3. Continues to hire abusive and disreputable security contractors;
4. Failed to fight for the needs of Afghan civilians; and
5. Has made little effort to win their hearts and minds.

A crucial statistic that demonstrates this is to compare military and security expenditures by the United States in Afghanistan with expenditures for civilian aid, such as reconstruction. That statistic is as follows:

Money spent on Military/Security: \$365 billion; money spent on Afghan civilians: \$8.5 billion. This latter number spells out “FAILURE.” U.S. diplomats and USAID officials have failed to improve the lives of ordinary Afghans and as a result they have accomplished the impossible. Their lack of resolve and interest has made an increasing number of disillusioned Afghans view Taliban rule as potentially an improvement.

### **Appendix (Supporting Information)**

Taliban Field Strength: The figure of 35,000 is based on an interview given by General Stanley McChrystal earlier this year.

#### **Taliban Soldiers Killed:**

The Pentagon refuses to disclose the total number of Taliban killed each month in Afghanistan by coalition forces, special operations personnel and the CIA. One reason became obvious during Operation Moshtarak in Marjah earlier this year. The Pentagon and NATO refused to specify the actual number of Taliban casualties in Marjah because the number was embarrassingly low. American, NATO and Afghan forces reportedly suffered more casualties (killed and wounded) than they inflicted on the Taliban, making Marjah a military defeat for the West (if casualties determine victory or defeat).

To fill the gap created by Pentagon silence on this issue, media groups have published their own Taliban casualty count based on official and press reports. That count is inflated as the U.S. military labels everyone it kills a “Taliban militant,” even if they are criminals, drug traders, war lords or civilians defending their homes. As a result of the Pentagon’s lack of credibility on this issue, this author assumes that only 50% of those labelled as Taliban actually are.

The Associated Press has reported that 3,800 militants were killed in 2008, and 4,500 in 2009. Pro-NATO blogs, such as the web site “Terrorist Death Watch,” have calculated that 3,667 terrorists have been killed in Afghanistan since January 1, 2006, (about 700 per year). The author assumes that averages of 2,000 hard-core Taliban are killed each year.

#### **U.S. Military Costs:**

Total military expenditures in Afghanistan are not clear as the Pentagon does not release all of its direct and indirect cost for the war. While most direct costs are known, billions of dollars in CIA and special operations costs are improperly classified and remain hidden. In addition, the indirect costs for the war (i.e., military regular pay, equipment depreciation, wear & tear, long term health costs, Pentagon support costs within the U.S., USTRANSCOM transportation costs, transport hub costs such as Manas air base, costs for borrowing funds etc.) are not precisely known. Independent studies conducted of the Iraq war are available and they calculate that the indirect costs equal or exceed the direct costs.

What we know about Pentagon direct costs is as follows:

From 2001, to April 2009, the Pentagon directly spent \$171.7 billion in Afghanistan.

From May 2009, to the present, the Pentagon directly spent an additional \$166.3 billion. This is an incredible increase over the past 17 months.

Monthly expenditures have also seen a staggering increase.

October 2009, the Pentagon was directly spending \$3.6 billion a month.

February 2010, the Pentagon was directly spending \$6.7 billion a month.

October 2010, with the addition of 35,000 more combat and support troops into Afghanistan, the number must be close to \$8 billion a month. Some estimates place direct Pentagon Afghan war costs for all of 2010, at \$105 billion.

### **U.S. State Department Costs:**

Officially the State Department and USAID have expended about \$35 billion in Afghanistan since 2001. According to most audits, about 75% or \$27.5 billion has been spent on training, housing and equipping the Afghan security services, and road construction with the balance (\$8.5 billion) being spent on civilian projects. Much of this \$8.5 billion has been wasted on dilapidated schools and minor “trophy” projects in Kabul.

## **They can file a charge posthumously against Jawaharlal Nehru too:**

Arundhati Roy

My reaction to today's court order directing the Delhi Police to file an FIR against me for waging war against the state: Perhaps they should posthumously file a charge against Jawaharlal Nehru too. Here is what he said about Kashmir:

1. In his telegram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the Indian Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru said, "I should like to make it clear that the question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the state to accede to India. Our view which we have repeatedly made public is that the question of accession in any disputed territory or state must be decided in accordance with wishes of people and we adhere to this view." (Telegram 402 Primin-2227 dated 27th October, 1947 to PM of Pakistan repeating telegram addressed to PM of UK).

2. In other telegram to the PM of Pakistan, Pandit Nehru said, "Kashmir's accession to India was accepted by us at the request of the Maharaja's government and the most numerously representative popular organization in the state which is predominantly Muslim. Even then it was accepted on condition that as soon as law and order had been restored, the people of Kashmir would decide the question of accession. It is open to them to accede to either Dominion then." (Telegram No. 255 dated 31 October, 1947).

### **Accession issue**

3. In his broadcast to the nation over All India Radio on 2nd November, 1947, Pandit Nehru said, "We are anxious not to finalise anything in a moment of crisis and without the fullest opportunity to be given to the people of Kashmir to have their say. It is for them ultimately to decide ----- And let me make it clear that it has been our policy that where there is a dispute about the accession of a state to either Dominion, the accession must be made by the people of that state. It is in accordance with this policy that we have added a proviso to the Instrument of Accession of Kashmir."

4. In another broadcast to the nation on 3rd November, 1947, Pandit Nehru said, "We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided

by the people. That pledge we have given not only to the people of Kashmir and to the world. We will not and cannot back out of it.”

5. In his letter No. 368 Primin dated 21 November, 1947 addressed to the PM of Pakistan, Pandit Nehru said, “I have repeatedly stated that as soon as peace and order have been established, Kashmir should decide of accession by Plebiscite or referendum under international auspices such as those of United Nations.”

### **U.N. supervision**

6. In his statement in the Indian Constituent Assembly on 25th November, 1947, Pandit Nehru said, “In order to establish our bona fide, we have suggested that when the people are given the chance to decide their future, this should be done under the supervision of an impartial tribunal such as the United Nations Organisation. The issue in Kashmir is whether violence and naked force should decide the future or the will of the people.”

7. In his statement in the Indian Constituent Assembly on 5th March, 1948, Pandit Nehru said, “Even at the moment of accession, we went out of our way to make a unilateral declaration that we would abide by the will of the people of Kashmir as declared in a plebiscite or referendum. We insisted further that the Government of Kashmir must immediately become a popular government. We have adhered to that position throughout and we are prepared to have a Plebiscite with every protection of fair voting and to abide by the decision of the people of Kashmir.”

### **Referendum or plebiscite**

8. In his press-conference in London on 16th January, 1951, as reported by the daily ‘Statesman’ on 18th January, 1951, Pandit Nehru stated, “India has repeatedly offered to work with the United Nations reasonable safeguards to enable the people of Kashmir to express their will and is always ready to do so. We have always right from the beginning accepted the idea of the Kashmir people deciding their fate by referendum or plebiscite. In fact, this was our proposal long before the United Nations came into the picture. Ultimately the final decision of the settlement, which must come, has first of all to be made basically by the people of Kashmir and secondly, as between Pakistan and India directly. Of course it must be remembered that we (India and Pakistan) have reached a great deal of agreement already. What I mean is that many basic features have been thrashed out. We all agreed that it is the people of Kashmir who must decide for themselves about their future externally or internally. It is an obvious fact that even without our agreement no country is going to hold on to Kashmir against the will of the Kashmiris.”

9. In his report to All Indian Congress Committee on 6th July, 1951 as published in the Statesman, New Delhi on 9th July, 1951, Pandit Nehru said, "Kashmir has been wrongly looked upon as a prize for India or Pakistan. People seem to forget that Kashmir is not a commodity for sale or to be bartered. It has an individual existence and its people must be the final arbiters of their future. It is here today that a struggle is bearing fruit, not in the battlefield but in the minds of men."

10. In a letter dated 11th September, 1951, to the U.N. representative, Pandit Nehru wrote, "The Government of India not only reaffirms its acceptance of the principle that the question of the continuing accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations but is anxious that the conditions necessary for such a plebiscite should be created as quickly as possible."

### **Word of honour**

11. As reported by Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, on 2nd January, 1952, while replying to Dr. Mookerji's question in the Indian Legislature as to what the Congress Government going to do about one third of territory still held by Pakistan, Pandit Nehru said, "is not the property of either India or Pakistan. It belongs to the Kashmiri people. When Kashmir acceded to India, we made it clear to the leaders of the Kashmiri people that we would ultimately abide by the verdict of their Plebiscite. If they tell us to walk out, I would have no hesitation in quitting. We have taken the issue to United Nations and given our word of honour for a peaceful solution. As a great nation we cannot go back on it. We have left the question for final solution to the people of Kashmir and we are determined to abide by their decision."

12. In his statement in the Indian Parliament on 7th August, 1952, Pandit Nehru said, "Let me say clearly that we accept the basic proposition that the future of Kashmir is going to be decided finally by the goodwill and pleasure of her people. The goodwill and pleasure of this Parliament is of no importance in this matter, not because this Parliament does not have the strength to decide the question of Kashmir but because any kind of imposition would be against the principles that this Parliament holds. Kashmir is very close to our minds and hearts and if by some decree or adverse fortune, ceases to be a part of India, it will be a wrench and a pain and torment for us. If, however, the people of Kashmir do not wish to remain with us, let them go by all means. We will not keep them against their will, however painful it may be to us. I want to stress that it is only the people of Kashmir who can decide the future of Kashmir. It is not that we have merely said that to the United Nations and to the people of Kashmir, it

is our conviction and one that is borne out by the policy that we have pursued, not only in Kashmir but everywhere. Though these five years have meant a lot of trouble and expense and in spite of all we have done, we would willingly leave if it was made clear to us that the people of Kashmir wanted us to go. However sad we may feel about leaving we are not going to stay against the wishes of the people. We are not going to impose ourselves on them on the point of the bayonet.”

### **Kashmir's soul**

13. In his statement in the Lok Sabha on 31st March, 1955 as published in Hindustan Times New Delhi on 1st April, 1955, Pandit Nehru said, “Kashmir is perhaps the most difficult of all these problems between India and Pakistan. We should also remember that Kashmir is not a thing to be bandied between India and Pakistan but it has a soul of its own and an individuality of its own. Nothing can be done without the goodwill and consent of the people of Kashmir.”

14. In his statement in the Security Council while taking part in debate on Kashmir in the 765th meeting of the Security Council on 24th January, 1957, the Indian representative Mr. Krishna Menon said, “So far as we are concerned, there is not one word in the statements that I have made in this council which can be interpreted to mean that we will not honour international obligations. I want to say for the purpose of the record that there is nothing that has been said on behalf of the Government of India which in the slightest degree indicates that the Government of India or the Union of India will dishonour any international obligations it has undertaken.”

### ***Taliban expands influence into northern Afghanistan***

In the once-peaceful north, Taliban forces have infiltrated Afghan villages and seized control, making the task of peacekeeping and reform even more difficult for NATO and U.S. troops.

In the past year, security in northern Afghanistan has deteriorated rapidly as insurgents have seized new territory in provinces such as Kunduz and Baghlan, and even infiltrated the scenic mountain oasis of Badakhshan. Each new northern base is becoming a hive of activity, with fighters rotating in and out, daily planning meetings and announcements at the mosque.

# Pakistan and the Naxalite Movement in India

Ben West

*Indian Maoist militants, known as Naxalites*, have been meeting with members of the outlawed Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), according to the director-general of police for India's Chhattisgarh state. Based on information from a police source, state police chief Vishwa Ranjan said Nov. 11 that two LeT operatives attended a Naxalite meeting in April or May. While their presence at the meeting still needs to be corroborated, the chief said, it appears very likely that the Naxalites held the meeting to adopt a new policy and plans for increasing "armed resistance" in order to seize political power in India.

Indian authorities are using the alleged meeting between LeT operatives and Naxalites as evidence that Pakistan is trying to forge relationships with the Naxalites, which India has long suspected. India *blamed the LeT for the 2008 Mumbai attacks* and the *2001 parliament attack*. For the Indian public, LeT also has become synonymous with Pakistani intelligence operations. The group that Indian officials refer to as "LeT," however, is no longer an ally of *Pakistan* and has changed so much in recent years that we have started to refer to it and similar groups as "*neo-LeT*".

Before this latest accusation, Indian officials implicated at least six other militant groups in Naxalite activities (with varying degrees of Pakistani support). Linking the estimated 10,000-strong Naxalites to militant groups backed by Pakistan, India's main geopolitical rival and primary source of external security threats, creates a "nightmare" scenario for India. Indeed, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has labeled the Naxalites "the biggest internal security challenge" to India. Taken at face value, reports of such an alliance lead to visions of well-trained, well-disciplined Naxal militants expanding their near-daily attacks on low-level rural targets in eastern India (known as the "Red Corridor") to political and *high-tech targets* in Calcutta, Hyderabad or even New Delhi. But such visions are alarmist and do not reflect the true nature of the very limited Pakistani-Naxalite relationship.

STRATFOR has watched *Indian officials link Pakistan to the Naxalites* before, but we have yet to see significant changes on the ground that would give any credence to the scenario outlined above. Many Indian officials are

equally insistent that no connections exist between Naxalites and Pakistan. Although the Naxalites have provided rhetorical support for Kashmiri (and other anti-Indian groups') opposition to New Delhi over the past year, there has been little action to back up the rhetoric. The Indians have long feared that outside powers would manipulate grassroots groups in India and further destabilize an *already regionalized country*. When the Naxalite movement began in the 1960s, New Delhi feared Beijing was trying to get a foothold in India, and for the past 50 years India has demonized Pakistan's *Inter-Services Intelligence directorate* (ISI) for allegedly supporting militant operations in India.

To better understand the allegation that Pakistan is supporting the Naxalites, we have decided to investigate the sources of Naxalite weapons and training to get an idea of how much outside help the Naxalites rely on in the first place, since this is one way to measure the level of outside assistance. The study below focuses on what types of arms Naxalites have access to, how they got them and who they got them from. While we did find evidence of some Pakistani involvement in supplying the weapons through third parties, the Naxalites appear to remain a very self-reliant group that has not established a strong partnership with Pakistan when it comes to weapons and training.

#### Weapons

Local Indian media sources report that Naxalite forces have an arsenal of approximately 20,000 weapons — an average of two weapons per soldier. The Naxalites have obtained this arsenal from four different sources:

From Indian security forces, either by Naxalite raids on their outposts in Naxalite-controlled areas or bribing or coercing members of the security forces to sell or give them firearms and ammunition, along with ballistic vests and tactical gear, including night-vision optics. This is the source of most Naxalite weapons, which include Indian-made assault rifles, light machine guns and carbines that fire 5.62mm NATO ammunition; variants of the AK-47 that fire 7.62mm rounds; and locally made shotguns of various gauges. Israeli-made sniper rifles have also been found in Naxalite caches on a few occasions, likely the Galil 7.62mm rifles that India acquired from Israel in efforts to target Naxalite leaders in the first place.

Theft from businesses operating in the Naxalite-controlled areas, including fertilizer distributors and mining companies that maintain stocks of explosives, blasting caps and detonators.

Local arms factories run directly by Naxalites or other criminal groups. These operations demonstrate a wide range of craftsmanship, from assembling makeshift weapons from discarded parts to more advanced


forging processes. These factories also produce homemade mortar rounds and components for improvised explosive devices.

Procuring foreign weapons, ammunition and explosives from external militant and criminal groups operating within and outside of India. Details on the types of weapons procured this way are available from seizures of weapons shipments into India that have included rifles in the .315- to .30-06-caliber range. Such shipments are traded for smuggling services or purchased with funds from banditry, extortion or revolutionary taxes. Purchasing weapons from the outside is very expensive. According to a 2009 India Daily News article, Naxalite expenditure reports seized by police showed that, over a six-month period, one zone command spent more than three-quarters of the unit's budget on weapons (\$70,214), with the rest (\$20,604) spent on supplies. Such evidence suggests that Naxalite weapon procurements from the outside have their limitations; obtaining them locally is far cheaper and can be done by virtually any Naxalite fighter.

The Naxalite arsenal is vast and diverse, consisting of weapons manufactured in China, Russia, the United States, Pakistan and India. Photographs of Naxalite units in training or on patrols show fighters wielding a variety of rifles in different calibres and conditions, indicating a lack of weapons uniformity across Naxalite units. While this does suggest a certain level of resourcefulness among the Naxalites, it also means that parts and ammunition are not interchangeable, which is an important tactical limitation. If one rifle breaks, its parts cannot be easily replaced. If one militant runs out of ammunition, he cannot turn to his neighbour for more rounds. Standardized weapons are a key advantage for organized militias (the Taliban, for example, virtually all use a variant of the AK-47), an advantage the Naxalites appear to be lacking. The lack of weapons uniformity among Naxalite groups indicates that they do not have a benefactor that has bestowed on them a reliable, standardized arsenal and have had to build up their own from scratch.

### **Outside Suppliers**

There are numerous reports in open-source media in India and elsewhere that link Naxalites to a number of militant and criminal groups throughout South Asia. These groups interact with Maoists from Nepal, secessionists in India's restive northeast, ISI-backed Islamists from Bangladesh, criminals from Myanmar and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. Weapons flow among these groups in a region that has historically been a *rich environment for secessionist movements*.



The British originally encouraged strong regional identities throughout the Indian subcontinent to prevent the various ethnic groups from uniting in opposition to British colonial rule. The Pakistanis continued that strategy in order to maintain leverage over India, supporting anti-Indian groups primarily in the *contested Kashmir region* and later in Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), which they used as bases for extending their activities into India. India also supported anti-Pakistani groups in Bangladesh in an attempt to offset this Pakistani pressure. The Naxalites have benefited from this arrangement, directly from foreign powers like Pakistan and, for the most part, through indirect relationships with other regional secessionist movements that also oppose New Delhi.

STRATFOR sources in India claim that Pakistani intelligence has established business relationships with Naxalites to sell arms and ammunition and lately has tried to use Naxal bases for anti-Indian activities. There is evidence that the ISI is providing weapons and ammunition to the Naxalites in exchange for money or services, mostly through third parties like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) or the ostensible

Bangladeshi militant leader Shailen Sarkar (both are described in more detail below). Naxalite leaders in India deny cooperating with Pakistan but have very publicly pledged their support for separatist movements in India. Sources in the Indian army say they are investigating but still lack the evidence to prove a direct link between the Naxalites and the ISI, since the Pakistanis continue to play a peripheral role.

The groups below are reported to have had contact with the Naxalites and to have provided various levels of support. Some of these groups have established links to the ISI, which makes them possible conduits of contact and support between Pakistan and the Naxalites.

ULFA, one of the largest, *most violent* secessionist movements in India's northeast, is accused of *working with ISI Islamist assets* along the Indian-Bangladeshi border, where it controls smuggling routes through the Siliguri corridor. The Indian government accuses the Naxalites of working with ULFA to smuggle drugs and counterfeit money through Siliguri on behalf of the ISI in exchange for weapons and explosives.

The People's Liberation Army of Manipur (PLAM) is a secessionist group in the northeastern Indian state of Manipur. According to Indian security officials, the respective political wings of the PLAM and the Naxalites signed a document in October 2010 pledging to "overthrow the ... Indian reactionary and oppressive regime." However, there are no documented instances of PLAM providing material support to the Naxalites. Indian intelligence agencies report that a militant from Manipur who was arrested in 2007 revealed that the PLAM leadership was in frequent contact with the LeT leadership in 2006 as directed by the ISI.

The National Social Council of Nagaland-Issac Muviah branch (NSCN-IM) is a secessionist movement in the northeast Indian state of Nagaland. Indian Home Secretary G.K. Pillai said in June that the leader of NSCN-IM helped members of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) smuggle weapons through Myanmar and Bangladesh. Indian officials in the state of Tripura accused the NSCN-IM of working jointly with the ISI in assisting militant cadres.

The People's War Group (PWG) was a militant faction of the Communist Party of India-Marxist/Leninist until 2004, when it left and helped form the CPI-M, which is the political arm of the Naxalite movement. In 2004, the PWG received bomb-making materials and training from groups like ULFA and NSCN-IM in Bangladesh in exchange for smuggling drugs into India, an effort organized by the ISI between 2000 and 2004, when the PWG was not under the Naxalite umbrella.

LTTE is an ethnic secessionist movement in northern Sri Lanka that was defeated by Sri Lanka's military in 2009 after 26 years of fighting. According to a surrendering Naxalite commander, LTTE militants taught Naxalites how to handle mines and grenades at a camp in Bastar, Chhattisgarh state. LTTE fighters have fled Sri Lanka since their 2009 defeat, and Indian authorities suspect that Tamil fighters are providing training for Naxalites in exchange for safe haven.

Nepalese Maoists comprise the militant wing of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal. They have exchanged training and weapons with Indian Naxalites, and there are also reports of Nepalese Maoists receiving medical care at Naxalite camps in India.

Shailen Sarkar is a member of the Communist Party of Bangladesh. The Indian Home Ministry accuses Sarkar's group of training Naxalites at ISI-funded camps in Bangladesh. The ministry also claims that Sarkar has met with Naxal leaders in India.

Evidence of direct links between the ISI and the Naxalites is hard to come by. The connections above show only links between Naxalites and Pakistan via third parties, which makes it hard to measure the influence that Pakistan has over Naxalite militants. Pakistan likely wants to keep its activities in India covert so as not to exacerbate an already tense diplomatic situation. Murky, circuitous relationships are most likely preferred in this kind of environment.

Indeed, Pakistan does not necessarily need much more than murky, circuitous relationships in order to keep pressure on New Delhi. The Naxalites are a low-maintenance, self-sustaining movement that will continue to undermine Indian rule in the country's east — Pakistan does not need to expend more resources to sustain this, and the Naxalites are likely wary of undermining their own local legitimacy by accepting too much assistance from an outside government. While something like a standardized arsenal compliments of the ISI would benefit the Naxalites operationally, such a move would be a high-risk, low-reward effort for Islamabad, which seeks to operate very subtly in India for the time being while tensions over the 2008 Mumbai attacks continue to cool off.

The lack of evidence of an institutional relationship between Naxalites and Pakistan does not mean that personal relationships between ISI assets and Naxalite cadres could not develop through the limited interaction now taking place. A combination of more aggressive people from both sides could

certainly lead to more concerted attacks in India, reminiscent of the 2008 *serial bombings* in cities throughout India.

Such attacks, however, would likely be more of a one-off exception. For the time being, reports of Pakistani-Naxalite cooperation will continue to surface, though this cooperation will probably involve third-party groups that give both Pakistan and the Naxalites plausible deniability. Until we see indications from either the Naxalites or Pakistan that they are willing to establish more robust connections and become more aggressive toward India, a coordinated militant campaign remains unlikely.

## Voice of a Dalit

People say Dalits must “Educate” and “Agitate” but they fail to see that it is well nigh impossible to muster such energy and resourcefulness to come to the level of upper castes. Dalit leaders and intellectuals should think of radical and revolutionary methods of rousing the spirits of Dalits. For example, the Dalits should throw away all symbols of Hinduism and its deities as the Mahars of Maharashtra did before embracing Buddhism. They throw away all photos and idols into the well and canals. *They should erase all Hindu identities.*

Now the cunning Brahmins (the rulers of India) have invented Valmiki as divine to fool Dalits and offer them yet one more deity. They should see through all their games. Cribbing and ranting against Brahmins may be counter-productive. Brahmins hate *Upanishads* because it advanced the concept of Brahma — a formless cosmic force and it made every living being to claim that it is part of this cosmic force (*Aham Brahmasmi*). Brahmins cannot ask the rulers and *samants* to build temples for formless gods. They lose their business. That is why there is hardly a temple for Brahma.

*As an outflanking move Dalit leaders should found a new religion. Dalits will be the future force to bring reforms to both Dalit and Muslim societies. Muslim and Dalit women can be a real challenge to Hindus. Hinduism must be discarded, only then the world will realize that India is not a Hindu country but ruled by Hindu minority that is barely 15% percent of India and the remaining 85% percent are Bahujans, Muslims , Christians and Sikhs. VT RAJSHEKA*

## **Statutory Role of the Armed Forces**

Asad Sufi

Latest instalment of Wikileaks raises questions about the role of the Armed Forces of Pakistan that affect the stability and future of all of South Asia including Pakistan and Jammu & Kashmir.

The future of Jammu and Kashmir is inevitably tied up with Pakistan where the armed forces have been in power for longer than political civil government. Military rule is not popular in Pakistan and it is deemed to be illegitimate almost universally. Yet, the people of Pakistan tire of corruption of the political class within a few years of general elections and look for a redeemer or saviour who should change not only the government but also the system. Fortunately, Pakistan has not had a successful junior officers coup d'état; it has always been the Army Chief who led a bloodless coup which was welcomed by the people initially. But none of the military leaders who became the President of the country gave the country a good government let alone made substantive changes to the system for the better. They made constitutional changes to secure legitimacy as President in civvies relying on the very same politicians they reviled when they took over. The hypocrisy and deception that attended their effort to become national leaders by the back door did huge damage to the country. The military was undermined as promotion to high ranks came to depend on personal loyalty rather than merit; the courting of discredited politicians robbed the 'redeemer' of the rationale or benefit from tighter discipline that characterised early days of military rule.

There are many countries in Asia where military leaders did become true redeemers of the nation. Almost every country of East Asia, Africa and Latin America has gone through the experience of military rule and most of them did transform into true democracies. Out of the democracies in the Muslim World – Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia – it was only Malaysia that avoided military rule before becoming a democracy. South Korea installed a military leader as the head of state the same time that General Ayub Khan took over in Pakistan. Pakistan was their role model and they sent delegations to study the system introduced by Ayub Khan. Just look at the economic progress made by South Korea which has provided the country the wherewithal not only for smooth change over to civil

government but also to become an Asian Tiger economy. Pakistan meanwhile has stagnated. Why?

There are two reasons for the sorry state in which Pakistan finds itself. One, in South Korea the army took over as an institution. The Army appointed a President who retired after his tenure came to an end; he did not attempt to set up a political party or contest elections. In Pakistan, the rulers were answerable to no one – not even the military. They were despots who lost the support of the military even before they lost public support. Yet, they continued in power and tried all sorts of political gimmicks and tricks to hang on. If they had been installed by the military and removed when they did not deliver, the military would have established itself as the ‘guardian of national interest and not of its chief’. The other reason is susceptibility to American bullying and pressure. While Ayub, Yahya and Zia ul Haq were never accused of undermining national aspirations and interests; General Musharraf was the first to have disregarded national interests and aspiration to please America or India or both. Fortunately, India that did not respond to his willingness to compromise the Kashmiri struggle for liberation because ‘resistance’ had become a potent reality; but Musharraf was ready and willing even though he could not deliver and India was afraid that Kashmiris and their supporters would spread the insurrection to all of India. As the Wikileaks confirm every political leader of Pakistan sought America’s blessing to underpin his rule. As things stand today, the people of Pakistan do not trust the Army leadership any more than they trust the ‘elected’ government of politicians.

The fresh instalment of Wikileaks reveals much of what of which was already well known. The people of Pakistan agree with the opinion of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia about President Asif Zardari. The revelations that are the subject of frenzy are: one: the Army Chief – General Kayani – told the US Ambassador that he considered getting President Zardari to resign if he did not reinstate the Judges that Musharraf had removed unlawfully; two: the Army Chief went public to express his opposition to Kerry-Lugar bill because it sought to give the politicians the right to influence promotions and appointments in the armed forces. The press in Pakistan is livid over the Army Chief meeting the US Ambassador in Pakistan and telling her that he had contemplated putting pressure on the President to resign and to convey the anxiety in the armed forces over ‘civil control’ over promotions and appointments in the armed forces. The question is whether the Army Chief was right in doing so? I believe he is right.

The armed forces have a statutory role to defend the country. They do so by keeping an eye on the enemies of the state (internal as well external); and taking action when the country’s land, air space or territorial waters are

violated. This role is statutory in its; it does not require permission from the government. In fact, when the civil government puts constraints on the military in performing its statutory role, the politicians are answerable to the parliament for doing so. It is the statutory duty of the Air Force to defend the air space of the country and it MUST shoot down the drones that regularly violate the air space of Pakistan. That the Air Force has been ordered not to shoot the drones down is an illegal constraint. The Government has to present its case for its order to the parliament and secure its approval. But it has chosen to lie instead; it has told the people and the parliament that it has not given permission to the American drones to raid inside Pakistan's territory. What can the Air Force or the armed forces do? When the Government orders are unlawful, there must be an institution and mechanism to stop it doing so. That institution is the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The ultimate mechanism to enforce the decisions of the Supreme Court is the Armed Forces. For the moment, no one is prepared to challenge the government lies over drone attacks and the institution as well the mechanism to safeguard the country's sovereignty are ineffective.

The refusal of the Zardari Administration to restore the judges who had been stopped from attending to their duties by General Musharraf was another challenge to the statutory obligation of the armed forces. It may be remembered that the Supreme Court had pre-empted Musharraf and ordered that in the event of Musharraf suspending or abrogating the constitution, all institutions of the state should disobey him and obey the Supreme Court to uphold the rule of law. This order was given to - among others - the Army Chief. If General Kayani contemplated measures to force President Zardari to reinstate the judges he was performing his constitutional obligation to come to the aid of the Supreme Court. There was no likelihood of President Zardari restoring the judges if there had no cost to him for not doing so. Press reports revealed several months ago that when the Government took no action on intelligence reports on the corruption of ministers, General Kayani asked President Zardari to remove corrupt ministers but he was told to 'mind his own business'. The question is whether corruption at high levels of government is a threat to the security and stability of the country? Clearly, the answer is, yes! In that case, it is the statutory duty of the institutions of the state to deal with the corrupt.

I reiterate that in the event of the government failing to safeguard national interests and aspirations, the institutions of the state have a statutory obligation to act. It is for the Supreme Court to rule what action is taken; it is for the armed forces, when asked by the Chief Justice, to implement the orders of the Supreme Court. Until now the military always acted unlawfully because it carried out the coup d'état first and then sought the approval of its action from the Supreme Court. The present COAS – General Kayani –

has been on the right side of the law. He went public in his opposition to some aspects of the Kerry- Lugar bill when he found that the vile provisions that made political interference in military promotions and appointments a pre-requisite for the US aid had been included on the request of Zardari Administration. If such interference is allowed, the discipline and efficiency of the armed forces would be as severely undermined as has been the case with the civil service when the protections to civil servants were removed under the 1973 Constitution by Late Mr Bhutto. The principle of ‘neutrality of civil servants’ was compromised forever. Civil servants have ever since been like private servants of politicians and prospects for ‘good governance’ that only politically neutral civil servants can deliver has been reduced to a futile dream.

Just as the dismissal of the Chief Justice of Pakistan set the stage for a successful movement for the independence of the judiciary, Wikileaks have brought into the open the resolve of the military to perform its statutory role to defend the country against internal and external threats to the security and stability of Pakistan. This role can be performed only when the military acts to uphold the law obeying the orders of high judiciary against defiant executive. If that happened, the country might see the back of President Zardari soon and an interim government installed with the task of restoring the integrity of the institutions. Wikileaks have helped clear the fog; Pakistanis do hope that the military would rise to the occasion and perform its statutory duty to underpin ‘good governance’. The people of Jammu and Kashmir have a reason to be hopeful; a government in Pakistan responsive to popular aspirations would be more confident in dealing with India.

## **India’s Afghan withdrawal**

If India leaves Afghanistan, there’s no way to avoid having the Taliban, Pakistan and all the Muslim world perceive the common-sense Indian departure as anything but a victory for Islam over Allah’s polytheist enemies. Unavoidably, India’s Afghan withdrawal will be seen as a triumph for Pakistan that restores its strategic depth; as an act that puts a huge dent in New Delhi’s oft-stated ambition to be a regional superpower; as a signal to India’s growing Islamist militant movement and its foreign backers that Hindu power is not invincible; and, by Beijing, as a sign of India’s lack of resolve at a time of rising Indo-Chinese tensions.

*MICHAEL SCHEUER*

## How the Afghan Counterinsurgency Threatens Pakistan

Anatol Lieven

By now, almost all the likely outcomes of US strategy in Afghanistan are bad ones. They range from unending civil war, with government forces barely managing to hold their own against the Taliban, to de facto partition of the country. There is a chance that the Taliban would accept a settlement involving a timetable for the complete withdrawal of US forces and a neutral central government of respected Muslim figures, together with de facto Taliban control of the Pashtun heartland in the south and Western economic aid. In return they would have to promise to exclude Al Qaeda and crack down on opium cultivation in their areas (as they did in 2000).

Given that most ordinary Taliban fighters, as expressed in a survey organized by Graeme Smith of the *Toronto Globe and Mail*, want the exit of Western troops and a Muslim (but not necessarily Taliban) government, it's likely that the rejection of such terms by the Taliban leadership would undermine their support on the ground. This solution would, however, be heavily dependent on the help of Pakistan as a mediator and as one of the regional guarantors of the subsequent settlement.

The top leadership of the Afghan Taliban is based in Pakistani Baluchistan under the protection of Pakistani military intelligence, and Pakistan has prevented the United States from launching drone attacks on them there (in contrast with the intensive campaign against targets in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas to the north). Taliban forces use Pakistani territory for rest and recuperation, with the support of the local Pashtun population. Pakistan also has close ties to the two other Afghan Pashtun Islamist forces allied to the Taliban, the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbadin Hekmetyar and the Haqqani network in the Afghan region of Greater Paktika. All of this gives Pakistan considerable influence over the Afghan Taliban—though it must be stressed that this influence is also limited. Any settlement brokered by Pakistan would have to be one the Taliban could accept without humiliation.

But if Pakistan is vital to a settlement, Pakistan is also vital in itself. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the survival of Pakistan, not Afghanistan, is the most important issue for Western and global security in that region. With six times Afghanistan's population, plus nuclear weapons, a highly trained 500,000-man army and a huge diasporas (especially in

Britain), Pakistan would increase the international terrorist threat by orders of magnitude if it collapsed. There is a widespread (though exaggerated) view in the West that the weakness of the Pakistani state and the strength of Islamist support may lead to country's collapse a real possibility. Leaving aside the danger (as exposed by WikiLeaks) of nuclear materials and skills reaching terrorist groups, the disintegration of the Pakistani army, with its highly trained engineers and anti-aircraft forces, would vastly increase the "conventional" terrorist threat to India and the West.

It was therefore with horror that I recently heard that the diminished threat from Al Qaeda means that some Western security officials are suggesting that the West can afford to put much more pressure on Islamabad to attack Taliban strongholds in Pakistan's border region, even though this may lead to greater destabilization within Pakistan. This is lunatic reasoning. The diminished power of Al Qaeda should be cause for the United States and NATO to find ways to withdraw from Afghanistan, not step up the fight against the Taliban—since it was to fight Al Qaeda that we went there in the first place. As for the terrorist threat to the West, this has never come from the Afghan Taliban—but it increasingly comes from the Pakistani Taliban and their allies, as the case of attempted Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad demonstrates.

Unfortunately, the current US strategy is headed in the opposite direction from using Pakistan to broker a settlement, and toward an intensified fight against the Taliban and intensified pressure on Pakistan. Even worse, there are barely the rudiments of a Plan B if that strategy fails. If it proves impossible to strengthen the Afghan National Army sufficiently within the next two years, the options will be stark: either US forces will have to fight on in Afghanistan indefinitely or they will have to accept the probable loss of the south and east of the country and either unending civil war or de facto partition through bloody war rather than negotiated agreement. Among other things, all these options will be bad for Pakistan, especially if India is drawn into much greater support for the anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. This would in effect lead to an Indo-Pakistani proxy war in Afghanistan.

It is worth looking closely at Soviet strategy in Afghanistan, for the current US approach is a variant of that strategy, albeit with serious—and potentially disastrous—differences. This is to build up the Afghan army to the point where it can hold the main population centres against the insurgents, even as the United States and NATO try to break off as many of those insurgents as possible through a mixture of bribery and military pressure.

This is not in itself a mistaken approach. After all, Soviet strategy succeeded. Backed by Soviet airpower, the Afghan army the Soviets left behind inflicted a shattering defeat on the mujahedeen in Jalalabad in the spring of 1989 (I was there on the mujahedeen side, as a young journalist for the *Times* of London). And with the Soviets gone, the nationalist element in hostility to the Kabul regime diminished, as educated and urban Afghans began to focus on what a victory of fanatical and brutalized rural guerrillas would mean for them.

The Afghan communist regime actually outlived the Soviet Union, collapsing only when Soviet subsidies ended. If one assumes that, following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States is not going to imitate the Soviet Union by abandoning its global role, adopting communism and disintegrating as a state, it is by no means implausible to imagine that the Afghan army, backed by US arms, money and airpower and facing a divided opposition, could hold off the Taliban after US ground forces withdraw.

There are, however, immense problems, moral and practical, with this approach, and with how it is being pursued in detail by the US forces. Equally important, not merely does the United States not possess a Plan B but much of what the US military is doing will make the creation of a viable Plan B very difficult.

The moral problem is that under this strategy the guerrilla war in Afghanistan will go on indefinitely, albeit perhaps—but only perhaps—at a gradually diminishing rate of violence. There will be no incentive for the Taliban leadership or their hardline followers to reach a settlement; and a Kabul regime that is bound to be more and more dominated by the military is also highly unlikely to seek such a settlement. Moreover, as long as the counterinsurgency continues, the Taliban will have every incentive to go on working with Al Qaeda and terrorist groups in Pakistan, which can provide them with limited but useful expertise in everything from the construction of IEDs to medical services.

Equally important, the present Afghan state and army suffer from very important weaknesses compared with the Soviet-backed regime. Put simply, the Soviets inherited the still recognizable core of the old Afghan royal state and army as these had existed since the 1880s, together with their tradition of defending the cities and centres of government against a variety of tribal and religious rebels. Moreover, the old army was chiefly Pashtun in composition, and the man the Soviets chose to take over the state they left behind, Najibullah Khan, was a strongly Pashtun figure with prestige among some of the Pashtun tribes.

In 2001 the United States smashed the Taliban quasi state, leaving Afghanistan essentially with no state, and no armed forces but the overwhelmingly non-Pashtun militias of the Northern Alliance. Although efforts to develop the army and bring more Pashtuns into it have been moderately successful, only a very small proportion of soldiers are from the southern areas that are the Taliban's stronghold. Whether the Afghan army will be able to hold the towns in these areas after the United States leaves is therefore highly questionable.

Finally, in one critical respect US strategy is out of step with Soviet strategy, as well as with Afghan tradition. This is in Washington's insistence that "reconciliation" requires Taliban commanders to leave the Taliban publicly, submit to the regime of Hamid Karzai and the "Afghan Constitution," renounce violence and lay down their arms. In the vast majority of cases, this is simply not going to happen. It is too humiliating, and in the event of a Taliban victory it would be an automatic death sentence. Meanwhile—as leading Karzai government officials have repeatedly indicated—US airstrikes and Special Forces assassinations are killing some of the very Taliban commanders who might be persuaded to abandon the struggle, even if they will never formally surrender.

The Soviets, like the British before them, pursued a very different and much more Afghan approach: instead of paying mujahedeen commanders to change sides publicly, they paid them to pretend to fight, or to fight to a limited extent in some places while keeping key communications routes open. This strategy was pursued by the Kabul regime before and after the Soviet withdrawal, using Soviet money. Such deals were an open secret when I travelled in Afghanistan with the mujahedeen, and at one point or another they were made by many of the leading mujahedeen commanders. By contrast, in the analysis of two leading younger experts on the Taliban, Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn (in a forthcoming book, *The Enemy We Created: The Myth of a Taliban/Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970–2010*), the present strategy of killing midlevel Taliban commanders only clears the way for younger and far more radical figures to take their place.

If the United States continues this strategy indefinitely, the consequences for Pakistan could be dire. It has been argued (by the British military chief, Gen. Sir David Richards, for example, in *Prospect* magazine) that it is necessary to defeat the Afghan Taliban in order to protect Pakistan from Islamist extremism. The truth is almost exactly the opposite. More than any other factor, it is our campaign in Afghanistan that has radicalized Pakistanis and turned many of them not only against the West but against their own government and ruling system. In the worst case, the consequence of

Western actions could be to destroy Pakistan as a state and produce a catastrophe that would reduce the problems in Afghanistan to insignificance by comparison.

Western military forces are seen by the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis with whom I have spoken over the past three years as engaged in an illegal occupation. The Pakistani government's cooperation with the United States is seen as a deep national humiliation and a betrayal of fellow Muslims. I do not endorse these views myself, but it is essential to recognize just how deep and widespread they are, and that a fateful symmetry is at work: while Western officials and journalists complain constantly that the Pakistani army is not doing enough to help the United States in Afghanistan, Pakistan's population regards it as doing far too much.

To put it at its bluntest, most Pakistanis see our presence in Afghanistan as closely akin to that of the Soviets from 1979 to 1989, and resistance to us as closely akin to the resistance of those days, and equally legitimate. These feelings are held not just by Islamists but by those Pakistanis—the great majority of the population—who have no desire to see a Taliban-style regime in their country; just as Pakistanis in the 1980s who sympathized with the Afghan mujahedeen had no desire to see such forces rule Pakistan. In other words, sympathy for the Afghan Taliban by no means necessarily equates to sympathy for the Pakistani Taliban. I have found the former sympathy among educated people in Karachi who detest the Taliban's social program but who are prepared to allow the Afghan Taliban at least some legitimacy as a "resistance movement."

In the Pashtun areas of Pakistan, the consequence first of the anti-Soviet war in the 1980s and now of the anti-American war has been to weaken still further the effectiveness and meaning of the frontier dividing the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is this ethno-religious solidarity, more than continuing support by the Pakistani state that is providing the Afghan Taliban with their bases inside Pakistan. This support from large elements of the Pakistani population will continue as long as Western soldiers are present in Afghanistan. Their presence, as well as US drone strikes on targets in Pakistan, also helps legitimize the campaign of the Pakistani Taliban against the Pakistani state. Since the survival of that state is a US interest that vastly outweighs anything that might happen in Afghanistan, it follows that the US goal should be to reduce that presence as soon as this can be managed, not to follow a strategy that risks prolonging it indefinitely.

If we are going to start talking to Mullah Omar and the Taliban leadership, we need to start doing so now—not in the expectation that this will lead to an early settlement but in the knowledge derived from all previous

experiences that such negotiations typically last for years before reaching a conclusion. It will take some time for positions to become clear and requisite levels of trust to be created. In such negotiations intermediaries are also typically required—which, under the circumstances, can only be Pakistan. American and NATO troops should fight on to defend their existing positions and buy time for the Afghan army to develop, but attacks on Taliban commanders and drone strikes in Pakistan should be drastically scaled back. Above all, there should be no extension of these attacks to new areas of Pakistan in an effort to kill Mullah Omar and other elements of the Taliban leadership, since one cardinal principle of negotiations is that you cannot try to kill the person with whom you are negotiating.

Of course, this approach may not work. The Taliban may prove too fanatical and ambitious, and it may prove impossible to persuade three other key players to accept such a settlement. These include Hamid Karzai, who would have to step down to make way for a neutral Afghan leader (unless, of course, negotiations drag on till 2014, when he is due to leave office); the commanders of the Afghan National Army, who would have to accept a purely token military presence in most Pashtun areas; and the US Army, which would have to accept something well short of victory. And regarding this third element, let us face facts: the US military command has great political power in Washington, which will constrain the options of both Democrats and Republicans on Afghanistan and other issues.

However, something short of victory does not have to mean open defeat and humiliation, in the style of Saigon in 1975. If this can be avoided, then other scenarios can be presented as at least qualified US successes, above all if they involve Taliban commitments against terrorism and heroin. Intelligent and candid US commanders already know that they cannot "win" in any traditional sense; but they are determined not to lose—and rightly so. Americans should not wish their armed forces to be led by quitters. The trick will be in the public presentation of any settlement.

Behind all these questions lies once again the issue of Pakistan's role, Pakistan's future and the US role in that future. Since our options for coercing Pakistan are so limited—at least, without actions that would risk destroying Pakistan and involving us in far worse disasters—we should try to make the best of an admittedly very difficult situation and seek Pakistan's help in finding a settlement to the Afghanistan conflict.

## The Crisis of Indian Democracy

Arundhati Roy

*This article presents a powerful indictment of Indian democracy by the Booker Prize-winning novelist and activist. She is a prominent and respected intellectual who has brought the Maoist-Naxalite struggle before a "new" and even international audience. After she wrote this article a decision was taken to escalate the war. Thirty-six battalions of the India Reserve Force were added to the existing 105 battalions, and 16,000 Special Police Officers (civilians armed and contracted to function as police) were added to the existing 30,000. The home minister promised to hire 175,000 policemen over the next five years. (It's a good model for an employment guarantee scheme: hire half the population to shoot the other half. You can fool around with the ratios if you like.) Two days later the army chief told his senior officers to be "mentally prepared to step into the fight against Naxalism . . . It might be in six months, or in a year or two, but if we have to maintain our relevance as a tool of the state, we will have to undertake things that the nation wants us to do." By August, the Hindustan Times said that India air force (IAF) will be used "The permission has been granted but with strict conditionalities. We cannot use rockets or the integral guns of the helicopters...No integral guns, only side-mounted guns with commandos on board may be employed at the discretion of the local commanders. This Brilliant article by Arundhati Roy was first posted by Newstatesman and has some meaningful conclusions. It may be noted that Arundhati Roy has now been formally charged for sedition by Delhi police. (Editor)*

Over the past few months, the government has poured tens of thousands of heavily armed paramilitary troops into the forest. The Maoists responded with a series of aggressive attacks and ambushes. More than 200 policemen have been killed. The bodies keep coming out of the forest. Slain policemen wrapped in the national flag, slain Maoists, displayed like hunter's trophies, their wrists and ankles lashed to bamboo poles; bullet-ridden bodies, bodies that don't look human any more, mutilated in ambushes, beheadings and summary executions. Of the bodies being buried in the forest, we have no news. The theatre of war has been cordoned off, closed to activists and journalists. So there are no body counts.

Earlier this year, in its biggest strike ever, in Dantewada the Maoists' People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) ambushed a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) company and killed 76 policemen. The party issued a coldly triumphant statement. Television milked the tragedy for everything it

was worth. The nation was called upon to condemn the killing. Many of us were not prepared to – not because we celebrate killing, nor because we are all Maoists, but because we have thorny, knotty views about Operation Green Hunt. For refusing to buy shares in the rapidly growing condemnation industry, we were branded “terrorist sympathisers” and had our photographs flashed repeatedly on TV like wanted criminals.

What were a CRPF contingent doing, patrolling tribal villages with 21 AK-47 rifles, 38 Insas rifles, and seven self-loading rifles, six light machine-guns, one Stengun and one two-inch mortar? To ask that question almost amounted to an act of treason.

Days after the ambush, I ran into two paramilitary commandos chatting to a bunch of drivers in a Delhi car park. They were waiting for their VIP to emerge from some restaurant or health club or hotel. Their view on what is going on involved neither grief nor patriotism. It was simple accounting. A balance sheet. They were talking about how many lakhs of rupees in bribes it takes for a man to get a job in the paramilitary forces, and how most families incur huge debts to pay that bribe. That debt can never be repaid by the pathetic wages paid to a jawan, for example. The only way to repay it is to do what policemen in India do – blackmail and threaten people, run protection rackets, demand payoffs, do dirty deals. (In the case of Dantewada, loot villagers, steal cash and jewellery.) But if the man dies an untimely death, it leaves the families hugely in debt. The anger of the men in the car park was directed at the government and senior police officers who make fortunes from bribes and then so casually send young men to their death. They knew that the handsome compensation that was announced for the dead in the 6 April attack was just to blunt the impact of the scandal. It was never going to be standard practice for every policeman who dies in this sordid war.

Small wonder then that the news from the war zone is that CRPF men are increasingly reluctant to go on patrol. There are reports of them fudging their daily logbooks, filling them with phantom patrols. Maybe they’re beginning to realize that they are only poor khaki trash — cannon fodder in a rich man’s war. There are thousands waiting to replace each one of them when they’re gone.

Yet in another major attack, the Maoists blew up a bus in Dantewada and killed about 44 people. Of them 16 were Special Police Officers (SPOs), members of the dreaded government sponsored people’s militia, the Salwa Judum. The rest of the dead were, shockingly, ordinary people, mostly Adivasis. The Maoists expressed perfunctory regret for having killed

civilians, but they came that much closer to mimicking the State's "collateral damage" defence.

Last month in Bihar the Maoists kidnapped four policemen and demanded the release of some of their senior leaders. A few days into the hostage drama, they killed one of them, an Adivasis policeman called Lucas Tete. Two days later they released the other three. By killing a prisoner in custody the Maoists once again harmed their own cause. It was another example of the Janus-faced morality of "revolutionary violence" that we can expect more of in a war zone, in which tactics trump rectitude and make the world a worse place.

Not many analysts and commentators who were pained by the Maoist killing of civilians in Dantewada pointed out that at exactly the same time as the bus was blown up by the Maoists, in Kalinganagar, Orissa, and in Balitutha and Potko in Jharkhand, the police had surrounded several villages and had fired on thousands of protesters resisting the takeover of their lands by the Tatas, the Jindals and Posco. Even now the siege continues. The wounded cannot be taken to hospital because of the police cordons. Videos uploaded on YouTube show armed riot police massing in the hundreds, being confronted by ordinary villagers, some of whom are armed with bows and arrows.

The one favour Operation Green Hunt has done ordinary people is that it has clarified things to them. Even the children in the villages know that the police work for the "companies" and that Operation Green Hunt isn't a war against Maoists. It's a war against the poor.

There's nothing small about what's going on. We are watching a democracy turning on itself, trying to eat its own limbs. We're watching incredulously as those limbs refuse to be eaten.

Of all the various political formations involved in the current insurrection, none is more controversial than the CPI (Maoist). The most obvious reason is its unapologetic foregrounding of armed struggle as the only path to revolution. Sumanta Banerjee's book *In the Wake of Naxalbari* is one of the most comprehensive accounts of the movement. It documents the early years, the almost harebrained manner in which the Naxalites tried to jump-start the Indian Revolution by "annihilating the class enemy" and expected the masses to rise up spontaneously. It describes the contortions it had to make in order to remain aligned with China's foreign policy, how it spread from state to state, and how Naxalism was mercilessly crushed.

Buried deep inside the fury that is directed against them by the orthodox left and the liberal intelligentsia is their unease with themselves and a puzzling, almost mystical protectiveness towards the Indian state. It's as though, when they are faced with a situation that has genuine revolutionary potential, they blink. They find reasons to look away. Political parties and individuals who have not in the last 25 years ever lent their support to say, the Narmada Bachao Andolan, or marched in solidarity with any one of the many of peaceful people's movements in the country, have suddenly begun to extol the virtues of non-violence and Gandhian Satyagraha. On the other hand, those who have been actively involved in these struggles may strongly disagree with the Maoists, they may be wary, even exasperated by them, but they do see them as a part of the same resistance.

It's hard to say who dislikes the Maoists more – the Indian state, its army of strategic experts and its instinctively right-wing middle class, or the Communist Party of India (CPI) and Communist Party of India (Marxist), usually called the CPM, the several splinter groups that were part of the original Marxist-Leninists or the liberal left. The argument begins with nomenclature. The more orthodox communists do not believe that “Maoism” is an “ism” at all. The Maoists in turn call the mainstream communist parties “social fascists” and accuse them of “economism” – basically, of gradually bargaining away the prospect of revolution.

Each faction believes itself to be the only genuinely revolutionary Marxist party or political formation. Each believes the other has misinterpreted communist theory and misunderstood history. Anyone who isn't a card-carrying member of one or the other group will be able to see that none of them is entirely wrong or entirely right about what they say. But bitter splits, not unlike those in religious sects, are the natural corollary of the rigid conformity to the party line demanded by all communist parties. So they dip into a pool of insults that dates back to the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, to the great debates between Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin, to Chairman Mao's Red Book, and hurl them at each other. They accuse each other of the “incorrect application” of “Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought”, almost as though it's an ointment that's being rubbed in the wrong place. (My earlier essay “Walking with the Comrades” landed directly in the flight-path of this debate. It got its fair share of entertaining insults, which deserve a pamphlet of their own.)

Other than the debate about whether or not to enter electoral politics, the major disagreement between the various strands of communism in India centres around their reading of whether conditions in the country are ripe for revolution. Is the prairie ready for the fire, as Mao announced in China, or is it still too damp for the single spark to ignite it? The trouble is that India

lives in several centuries simultaneously, so perhaps the prairie, that vast stretch of flat grassland, is the wrong analogy for India's social and political landscape. Maybe a "warren" would be a better one. To arrive at a consensus about the timing of the revolution is probably impossible. So everybody marches to his or her own drumbeat. The CPI and the CPM have more or less postponed the revolution to the afterlife. For Charu Majumdar, founder of the Naxalite movement, it was meant to have happened 30 years ago. According to the Ganapathy, current chief of the Maoists, it's about 50 years away.

Today, 40 years after the Naxalbari uprising, the main charge against the Maoists by the parliamentary left continues to be what it always was. They are accused of suffering from what Lenin called an "infantile disorder", of substituting mass politics with militarism and of not having worked at building a genuinely revolutionary proletariat. They are seen as having contempt for the urban working class, of being an ideologically ossified force that can only function as a frog-on-the-back of "innocent" (read primitive) jungle-dwelling tribal people who, according to orthodox Marxists, have no real revolutionary potential. (This is not the place perhaps, to debate a vision that says people have to first become wage-earners, enslaved to a centralized industrial system, before they can be considered revolutionary.)

The charge that the Maoists are irrelevant to urban working-class movements, to the Dalit movement, to the plight of farmers and agricultural workers outside the forests is true. There is no doubt that the Maoist Party's militarized politics makes it almost impossible for it to function in places where there is no forest cover. However, it could equally be argued that the major communist parties have managed to survive in the mainstream only by compromising their ideologies so drastically that it is impossible to tell the difference between them and other bourgeois political parties any more. It could be argued that the smaller factions that have remained relatively uncompromised have managed to do so because they do not pose a threat to anybody.

Whatever their faults or achievements as bourgeois parties, few would associate the word "revolutionary" with the CPI or CPM anymore. (The CPI does play a role in some of the struggles against mining companies in Orissa.) But even in their chosen sphere of influence they cannot claim to have done a great service to the proletariat they say they represent. Apart from their traditional bastions in Kerala and West Bengal, both of which they are losing their grip over, they have very little presence in any other part of the country, urban or rural, forest or plains. They have run their trade unions into the ground. They have not been able to stanch the massive job

losses and the virtual disbanding of the formal workforce that mechanization and the new economic policies have caused. They have not been able to prevent the systematic dismantling of workers' rights. They have managed to alienate themselves almost completely from Adivasis and Dalit communities. In Kerala many would say that they have done a better job than other political parties, but their 30-year "rule" in West Bengal has left that state in ruins. The repression they unleashed in Nandigram and Singur, and now against the Adivasis of Jangalmahal, will probably drive them out of power for a few years. (Only for as long as it takes Mamta Banerjee of the Trinamool Congress to prove that she is not the vessel into which people should pour their hopes.) Still, while listing a litany of their sins, it must be said that the demise of the mainstream communist parties is not something to be celebrated. At least not unless it makes way for a new, more vital and genuinely left movement in India.

The Maoists (in their current as well as earlier avatars) have had a different political trajectory. The redistribution of land, by violent means if necessary, was always the centrepiece of their political activity. They have been completely unsuccessful in that endeavour. But their militant interventions, in which thousands of their cadre – as well as ordinary people – paid with their lives, shone a light on the deeply embedded structural injustice of Indian society. If nothing else, from the time of the Telengana movement, which, in some ways, was a precursor to the uprising in Naxalbari, the Naxalite movement, for all its faults, sparked an anger about being exploited and a desire for self-respect in some of the most oppressed communities. In West Bengal it led to Operation Bargadar ("sharecropper") and to a far lesser extent in Andhra Pradesh it shamed the government into carrying out some land reform. Even today, all the talk about "uneven development" and "exploitation" of tribal areas by the prime minister, the government's plans to transfer Joint Forest Management funds from the Forest Department directly to the Gram Panchayats, the Planning Commission's announcement that it will allocate Rs14, 000 crores for tribal development, has not come from genuine concern, it has come as a strategy to defuse the Maoist "menace". If those funds do end up benefiting the Adivasi community, instead of being siphoned away by middlemen, then the "menace" surely ought to be given some credit. Interestingly, though the Maoists have virtually no political presence outside forested areas, they do have a presence in the popular imagination, an increasingly sympathetic one, as a party that stands up for the poor against the intimidation and bullying of the State. If Operation Green Hunt becomes an outright war instead of a "sub-conventional" one, if ordinary Adivasis start dying in huge numbers, that sympathy could ignite in unexpected ways.

Among the most serious charges levelled against the Maoists is that its leaders have a vested interest in keeping people poor and illiterate in order to retain their hold on them. Critics ask why, after working in areas like Dandakaranya for 30 years, they still do not run schools and clinics, why they don't have check dams and advanced agriculture, and why people are still dying of malaria and malnutrition. Good question. But it ignores the reality of what it means to be a banned organisation whose members – even if they are doctors or teachers – are liable to be shot on sight. It would be more useful to direct the same question to the government of India, which has none of these constraints. Why is it that in tribal areas that are not overrun by Maoists there are no schools, no hospitals, no check dams? Why do people in Chhattisgarh suffer from such acute malnutrition that doctors have begun to call it “nutritional AIDS” because of the effect it has on the human immune system?

In their censored chapter in the ministry of Panchayati Raj report, Ajay Dandekar and Chitragada Choudhury (no fans of the Maoists – they call the party ideology “brutal and cynical”) write: “So the Maoists today have a dual effect on the ground in PESA areas. By virtue of the gun they wield, they are able to evoke some fear in the administration at the village/block/district level. They consequently prevent the common villager's powerlessness over the neglect or violation of protective laws like PESA, e.g., warning a talathi, who might be demanding bribes in return for fulfilling the duty mandated to him under the Forest Rights Act, a trader who might be paying an exploitative rate for forest produce, or a contractor who is violating the minimum wage. The party has also done an immense amount of rural development work, such as mobilising community labour for farm ponds, rainwater harvesting and land conservation works in the Dandakaranya region, which villagers testified had improved their crops and improved their food security situation.”

In their recently published empirical analysis of the working of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA) in 200 Maoist-affected districts in Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, which appeared in *The Economic and Political Weekly*, the authors Kaustav Banerjee and Partha Saha say:

“The field survey revealed that the charge that the Maoists have been blocking developmental schemes does not seem to hold much ground. In fact Bastar seems to be doing much better in terms of NREGA than some other areas . . . on top of that, the wage struggles, the enforcement of minimum wages can be traced back to the wage struggles led by the Maoists in that area. A clear result that we came across is the doubling of the wage rates for tendu leaf collection in most Maoist areas . . . Also, the Maoists

have been encouraging the conduct [sic] of social audits since this helps in the creation of a new kind of democratic practice hitherto unseen in India.”

Implicit in a lot of the debate around Maoists is the old, patronising, tendency to cast “the masses”, the Adivasi people in this case, in the role of the dim-witted horde, completely controlled by a handful of wicked “outsiders”. One university professor, a well-known Maoist baiter, accused the leaders of the party of being parasites preying on poor Adivasis. To bolster his case, he compared the lack of development in Dandakaranya to the prosperity in Kerala. After suggesting that the non-Adivasi leaders were all cowards “hiding safely in the forest”, he appealed to all Adivasi Maoist guerrillas and village militia to surrender before a panel of middle-class Gandhian activists (hand-picked by him). He called for the non-Adivasi leadership to be tried for war crimes. Why non-Adivasi Gandhians are acceptable, but not non-Adivasi Maoists, he did not say. There is something very disturbing about this inability to credit ordinary people with being capable of weighing the odds and making their own decisions.

In Orissa, for instance, there are a number of diverse struggles being waged by unarmed resistance movements that often have sharp differences with each other. And yet between them all they have managed to temporarily stop some major corporations from being able to proceed with their projects – the Tatas in Kalinganagar, Posco in Jagatsinghpur, Vedanta in Niyamgiri. Unlike in Bastar, where they control territory and are well entrenched, the Maoists tend to use Orissa only as a corridor for their squads to pass through. But as the security forces close in on peaceful movements and ratchet up the repression, local people have to think very seriously about the pros and cons of involving the Maoist Party in their struggles. Will its armed squads stay and fight the state repression that will inevitably follow a Maoist “action”? Or will they retreat and leave unarmed people to deal with police terror? Activists and ordinary people falsely accused of being Maoists are already being jailed. Many have been killed in cold blood. But a tense, uneasy dance continues between the unarmed resistance and the CPI (Maoist). On occasion, the party has done irresponsible things which have led to horrible consequences for ordinary people. In 2006 at the height of the tension between the Dalit and Adivasi communities in Kandhamal District, the Maoists shot dead Laxmananda Saraswati, leader of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, a fascist outfit of proselytisers, working among Adivasis to bring them “back into the Hindu fold”. After the murder, enraged Kandha tribals who had been recently converted to Hinduism were encouraged to go on a rampage. Almost 400 villages were convulsed with anti-Christian violence. Fifty-four Panna Dalit Christians were killed, more than 200 churches burned. Tens of thousands had to flee their homes. Many still live in camps, unable to return. A somewhat different, but equally dangerous situation is

brewing in Narayanpatna and Koraput, districts where the Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangh (which the police say is a Maoist “front”) is fighting to restore land to Adivasis that was illegally appropriated by local moneylenders and liquor dealers (many of them Dalit). These areas are reeling under police terror, with hundreds of Adivasis thrown in Koraput jail and thousands living in the forests, afraid to go home.

People who live in situations like this do not simply take instructions from a handful of ideologues that appear out of nowhere waving guns. Their decisions of what strategies to employ take into account a whole host of considerations: the history of the struggle, the nature of the repression, the urgency of the situation, and quite crucially, the landscape in which their struggle is taking place. The decision of whether to be a Gandhian or a Maoist, militant or peaceful, or a bit of both (like in Nandigram), is not always a moral or ideological one. Quite often it’s a tactical one. Gandhian satyagraha, for example, is a kind of political theatre. In order for it to be effective, it needs a sympathetic audience, which villagers deep in the forest do not have. When a posse of 800 policemen lays a cordon around a forest village at night and begins to burn houses and shoot people, will a hunger strike help? (Can starving people go on a hunger strike? And do hunger strikes work when they’re not on TV?) Equally, guerrilla warfare is a strategy that villages in the plains, with no cover for tactical retreat, cannot afford. Fortunately people are capable of breaking through ideological categories, and of being Gandhian in Jantar Mantar, militant in the plains and guerrilla fighters in the forest without necessarily suffering from a crisis of identity. The strength of the insurrection in India is its diversity, not uniformity.

Since the government has expanded its definition of “Maoist” to include anybody who opposes it, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that the Maoists have moved to centre stage. However, their doctrinal inflexibility, their reputed inability to countenance dissent, to work with other political formations and, most of all, their single-minded, grim, military imagination makes them too small to fill the giant pair of boots that is currently on offer.

(When I met Comrade Roopi in the forest, the first thing the techie-whiz did after greeting me was to ask about an interview I did soon after the Maoists had attacked Rani Bodili, a girls’ school in Dantewada which had been turned into a police camp. More than 50 policemen and SPOs were killed in the attack. “We were glad that you refused to condemn our Rani Bodili attack, but then in the same interview you said that if the Maoists ever come to power the first person we would hang would probably be you,” he said. “Why did you say that? Why do you think we’re like that?” I was settling into my long answer, but we were distracted. I would probably have started

with Stalin's purges – in which millions of ordinary people and almost half of the 75,000 Red Army officers were either jailed or shot, and 98 out of 139 Central Committee members were arrested; gone on to the huge price people paid for China's Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution; and might have ended with the Pedamallapuram incident in Andhra Pradesh, when the Maoists, in their previous avatar People's War, killed the village sarpanch and assaulted women activists for refusing to obey their call to boycott elections.)

Coming back to the question: who can fill that giant pair of boots? Perhaps it cannot, and should not be, a single pair of feet. Sometimes it seems very much as though those who have a radical vision for a newer, better world do not have the steel it takes to resist the military onslaught, and those who have the steel do not have the vision.

Right now the Maoists are the most militant section of a bandwidth of resistance movements fighting an assault on Adivasi homelands by a cartel of mining and infrastructure companies. To deduce from this that the CPI (Maoist) is a party with a new way of thinking about "development" or the environment might be a little far-fetched. (The one reassuring sign is that it has cautiously said that it is against big dams. If it means what it says, that alone would automatically lead to a radically different development model). For a political party that is widely seen as opposing the onslaught of corporate mining, the Maoists' policy (and practice) on mining remains pretty woolly. In several places where people are fighting mining companies there is a persistent view that the Maoists are not averse to allowing mining and mining-related infrastructure projects to go ahead as long as they are given protection money. From interviews and statements made by their senior leaders on the subject of mining, what emerges is a sort of "we'll do a better job" approach. They vaguely promise "environmentally sustainable" mining, higher royalties, better resettlement for the displaced and higher stakes for the "stakeholders". (The present minister for mining and mineral resources, too, thinking along the same lines, stood up in parliament and promised that 26 per cent of the "profits" from mining would go into "tribal development". What a feast that will be for the pigs at the trough!)

But let's take a brief look at the star attraction in the mining belt – the several trillion dollars' worth of bauxite. There is no environmentally sustainable way of mining bauxite and processing it into aluminium. It's a highly toxic process that most western countries have exported out of their own environments. To produce one tonne of aluminium you need about six tonnes of bauxite, more than a thousand tonnes of water and a massive amount of electricity. For that amount of captive water and electricity, you need big dams, which, as we know, come with their own cycle of

cataclysmic destruction. Last of all – the big question – what is the aluminium for? Where is it going? Aluminium is the principal ingredient in the weapons industry – for other countries’ weapons’ industries. Given this, what would a sane, “sustainable” mining policy be? Suppose, for the sake of argument, the CPI (Maoist) were given control of the so-called Red Corridor, the tribal homeland – with its riches of uranium, bauxite, limestone, dolomite, coal, tin, granite, marble – how would it go about the business of policymaking and governance? Would it mine minerals to put on the market in order to create revenue, build infrastructure and expand its operations? Or would it mine only enough to meet people’s basic needs? How would it define “basic needs”? For instance, would nuclear weapons be a “basic need” in a Maoist nation state?

Judging from what is happening in Russia and China, and even Vietnam, communist and capitalist societies eventually seem have one thing in common – the DNA of their dreams. After their revolutions, after building socialist societies that millions of workers and peasants paid for with their lives, both countries now have begun to reverse some of the gains of their revolutions and have turned into unbridled capitalist economies. For them, too, the ability to consume has become the yardstick by which progress is measured. For this kind of “progress” you need industry. To feed the industry you need a steady supply of raw material. For that, you need mines, dams, domination, colonies, and war. Old powers are waning, new ones rising. Same story, different characters – rich countries plundering poor ones. Yesterday it was Europe and America, today its India and China. Maybe tomorrow it will be Africa. Will there be a tomorrow? Perhaps it’s too late to ask, but then hope has little to do with reason.

Can we expect that an alternative to what looks like certain death for the planet will come from the imagination that has brought about this crisis in the first place? It seems unlikely. The alternative, if there is one, will emerge from the places and the people who have resisted the hegemonic impulse of capitalism and imperialism instead of being co-opted by it.

Here in India, even in the midst of all the violence and greed, there is still immense hope. If anyone can do it, we can do it. We still have a population that has not yet been completely colonised by that consumerist dream. We have a living tradition of those who have struggled for Gandhi’s vision of sustainability and self-reliance, for socialist ideas of egalitarianism and social justice. We have Ambedkar vision, which challenges the Gandhians as well the socialists in serious ways. We have the most spectacular coalition of resistance movements with experience, understanding and vision.

Most important of all, India has a surviving Adivasi population of almost 100 million. They are the ones who still know the secrets of sustainable living. If they disappear, they will take those secrets with them. Wars like Operation Green Hunt will make them disappear. So, victory for the prosecutors of these wars will contain within itself the seeds of destruction, not just for Adivasis, but, eventually, for the human race. That's why the war in central India is so important. That's why we need a real and urgent conversation between those all those political formations that are resisting this war.

The day capitalism is forced to tolerate non-capitalist societies in its midst and to acknowledge limits in its quest for domination, the day it is forced to recognise that its supply of raw material will not be endless, is the day when change will come. If there is any hope for the world at all, it does not live in climate-change conference rooms or in cities with tall buildings. It lives low down on the ground, with its arms around the people who go to battle every day to protect their forests, their mountains and their rivers, because they know that the forests, the mountains and the rivers protect them.

The first step towards reimagining a world gone terribly wrong would be to stop the annihilation of those who have a different imagination – an imagination that is outside of capitalism as well as communism. An imagination which has an altogether different understanding of what constitutes happiness and fulfilment. To gain this philosophical space, it is necessary to concede some physical space for the survival of those who may look like the keepers of our past, but who may really be the guides to our future. To do this, we have to ask our rulers: Can you leave the water in the rivers? The trees in the forest? Can you leave the bauxite in the mountain? If they say cannot, then perhaps they should stop preaching morality to the victims of their wars.

## Wisdom of Noam Chomsky

As opposed to the cables of Wikileaks the American intellectual Noam Chomsky cited a Brookings Institution poll that 80 per cent of Arabs consider Israel as the main threat followed by the U.S. at 77 per cent. **Only 10 per cent rated Iran as a danger.** He concluded by stating, “When they talk about Arabs, they mean the Arab dictators, not the population, which is overwhelmingly opposed to the conclusions that the analysts-Clinton and the media-have drawn.” According to another report, the Arab rulers “dare follow the American line completely, particularly if this includes a strike against Iran if they did, they'd risk popular revolts”.

# How to Win Back Pakistan

*Michael O'Hanlon*

*Nine years into the war in Afghanistan, the United States should have a clear idea of Pakistan's interests there. It's time to take these lessons to heart -- and start applying the right incentives.*

As recent intelligence findings reported by the *Washington Post* in late October confirm, Pakistan remains at the heart of the U.S.-led coalition's problems in Afghanistan -- where the war is hardly lost, yet hardly headed for clear victory either. Indeed, Pakistan arguably remains the most complex ally the United States has ever had in wartime, making President Franklin D. Roosevelt's challenges in dealing with Stalin (a far worse leader, but at least one who knew the outcome he wanted) seem simple by comparison.

Nine years into the campaign, we still can't clearly answer the question of whether Pakistan is with us or against us. America needs bold new policy measures to help Islamabad -- in all its many dimensions and factions -- make up its mind.

The crux of the problem is this: Despite allowing massive NATO logistics operations through its territory and helping the United States pursue al Qaeda operatives, Pakistan tolerates sanctuaries on its soil for the major insurgencies fighting in Afghanistan. These include the Afghan Taliban (otherwise known as the Quetta Shura Taliban because its principle base remains in Quetta in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan) as well as the Haqqani and Hezb-i-Islami Gulbadin (HiG) networks. The Haqqanis straddle the border between the Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika as well as North Waziristan and other tribal areas within Pakistan; HiG is further north, operating in and around the Khyber Pass connecting Kabul and Jalalabad in Afghanistan with Peshawar and points east in Pakistan. Thus, all three *major Afghan insurgent groups* have home bases in Pakistan, and despite the occasional drone strike are generally beyond NATO's reach as a result.

Pakistan has done some worthy things against extremists in its remote northern and western areas in recent years. Specifically, it has recognized the so-called Pakistani Taliban (the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP) as a mortal threat to the Pakistani state and responded accordingly. After suffering hundreds of bombings and assassination attacks by the TTP, including the killing of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007 and several thousand casualties a year to its troops and citizens since roughly

that time, it has responded in force, particularly over the last year and a half or so. It has swung about 100,000 troops previously guarding the border with Pakistan's nemesis India to the north-western tribal regions and cleared several major areas including South Waziristan, Bajaur, and the Swat Valley. This is all to the good.

Pakistanis argue, however, that limited numbers of ground troops combined with the past year's admittedly devastating floods prevent them from doing more. Quetta, North Waziristan, and other key places remain dens of iniquity, havens for extremists who continue to attack NATO and Afghan troops across the border and then return home for rest, regrouping, and fresh recruiting. Major command-and-control hubs are permanently located within Pakistan as well, and key insurgent leaders like Mullah Omar (to say nothing of Osama bin Laden) probably remain safely ensconced on Pakistani territory where U.S. forces cannot get at them.

But even if limited Pakistani capacity is part of the problem, there's more at stake. Pakistan worries that President Barack Obama's promise to start reducing U.S. troops in Afghanistan come July will lead to anarchy and civil conflict next door, and it is retaining proxies that it can use to ensure that its top goal in Afghanistan -- keeping India out -- can be accomplished come what may. Pakistan would rather have the Taliban and the Haqqanis back in power, especially in the country's south and east, than any group like the former Northern Alliance, which it views as too close to New Delhi. It is this strategic calculation, more than constrained Pakistani resources, that constitutes Obama's main challenge in Afghanistan. And it could cost him the war.

Under these circumstances, part of the right policy is to keep doing more of what the Obama administration has been doing with Pakistan -- building trust, as with last month's strategic dialogue in Washington; increasing aid incrementally, as with the new five-year \$2 billion aid package announced during that dialogue; and coordinating militarily across the border region. But Obama also needs to think bigger.

First, he needs to make clear America's commitment to South Asia, to wean Pakistan away from its current hedging strategy. Obama has frequently used general language to try to reassure listeners in the region that there will be no precipitous U.S. withdrawal next summer. But few fully believe him. Hearing stories like Bob Woodward's accounts of how the vice president and White House advisors have generally opposed a robust counterinsurgency strategy in favour of a counterterrorism-oriented operation with far fewer U.S. troops, they worry that next summer's withdrawal will be fast. Obama needs to explain that he will not revert to

such a minimalist "Plan B" approach under any imaginable circumstances. More appropriate would be a "Plan A-minus" that involves a gradual NATO troop drawdown as Afghan forces grow in number and capability, without necessarily first stabilizing the entire south and east, should the current strategy not turn around the violence by next summer or so. This would represent a modification to the current plan rather than a radical departure. The president can find a way to signal that this is in fact his own thinking, sooner rather than later -- ideally before the year is out.

Second, Obama should offer Islamabad a much more expansive U.S.-Pakistani relationship if it helps win this war. Two major incentives would have particular appeal to Pakistan. One is a civilian nuclear energy deal like that being provided to India; Pakistan's progress on export controls in the wake of the A.Q. Khan debacle has been good enough so far to allow a provisional approval of such a deal if other things fall into place as well. Second is a free trade accord. Struggling economically, Pakistan needs such a shot in the arm, and a trade deal could arguably do even more than aid at this point.

### ***Dangerous Escalations- Pakistan under Pressure***

*Front page article New York times reported "senior American military commanders in Afghanistan" are pushing for the Obama administration to approve frequent ground raids into Pakistani tribal areas, where, according to Washington, Al Qaeda leaders have sanctuaries.*

*It is an open secret that the US is conducting what the Times article calls "America's clandestine war in Pakistan," but that war has largely consisted of missile attacks from CIA-operated pilotless drones carried out in border regions. These attacks have killed thousands of Pakistanis, overwhelmingly civilians. They have been dramatically stepped up by the Obama administration. Since September, there have been over 54 such attacks in North Waziristan and elsewhere, compared to 60 over the preceding eight months.*

*These attacks arouse deep and broad anger within the Pakistani population particularly in the rank and file of armed forces against both the US and the Pakistani regime. But Washington is relentlessly racking up pressure on Pakistan to expand its military operations in the tribal regions, already involving over 100,000 Pakistani troops, to North Waziristan. US political and military officials have made clear their displeasure over Islamabad's refusal so far to set a date for an offensive in North Waziristan. (Editor)*

